

“WHAT DO YOU WANT?”¹

Philip McShane

It seems as well to recall now that the title of this essay was introduced at the beginning of the *Joistings* series.² No harm, indeed, in quoting that beginning immediately, including its lengthy single footnote.

“In my most recent perspective the series I am about to begin is about the first words of Jesus in John’s Gospel, the dominant question of human history: “What do you want?”³ It is there in Vedic desire and in ancient African rhythms. But what is most evident is that it is there in you. What is there? The spontaneous orientation, whose spontaneity may well be clouded by the culture’s offerings regarding its thematic.”⁴

The context of the previous *Joistings* would obviously enrich the present reading, but it is not essential to it. Indeed, the present essay is one about⁵ contexts of enrichment rather than one demanding such contexts. So, for instance, there is a context of enrichment in so far as one pauses over the title question as a sort of an inner-divine dialogue: Hindu or Christian or even mono-divine self-searching⁶. Of course, in a developed perspective on divinity, the question- mark comes to be acknowledged as metaphorical.⁷ But there is an enrichment to be had in brooding over the divine brooding. And it can be further enriched in so far as the “you” is not inner to divinity but “the other” brooded over by the divine, in whatever sense a high religion gives “the other”: then the want becomes the want of history, the desire of the everlasting hills or the hills of Zulu Africa.

It is this want, especially as an educational want, that is my present topic, the want as brooded over by divinity and humanity, indeed best done in the togetherness of divinity and humanity that can be identified as kataphatic prayer.⁸

However, the simplest meaning of the title is as a question from me to you, a question then to be brooded over and cherished by you. Yet this is not really that simple. I spent some time yesterday working through journals on “Cognitive Studies”—we return to that

zone presently—brooding in particular on the meaning of the question mark that occurred occasionally in a title.⁹ The entire tradition of Cognitive Studies is an embodied stand against admitting that meaning into registering consciousness or into print.¹⁰ But the tradition reaches wider as an ethos of self-neglect.¹¹

So, there is the oddity of finding it necessary to re-assert the question, pretty well like saying, “No: I really mean the question, What do **you** want?” One might parallel this to a waiter trying to nudge a pre-dinner drinker to focus on the menu, but here the guest is drunk on the conventions of contemporary scholarship. Are you?

Are you, perhaps, a reader of the three previous essays that I wrote on education?¹² Then, certainly, they gave sufficient food—and drink—for thought of not just the future but your future. This is true also if you have been a reader of the book, *ChrISt in History*, or attended the related Conference.¹³ But is not the home-going from such a reading or conference not regularly a return to a future which is a maintenance of the past? A reading or a conference in physics that draws attention to the revelation by research of a systems-disturbing new particle permits such a home-coming only to those who opt for drop-out status. Whether in *ChrISt in History* or in the three previous essays on education or in the school text referred to in both,¹⁴ I have drawn attention to a systems-disturbing new poise. Drawn attention? But have I so drawn your attention, in any real sense, real assent, real ascent?

We are back with my mis-reading or over-reading or spiritual reading of the text from John mentioned in footnote 3. “And I, if ‘I’ be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men to myself.”

We are, it seems to me, in very deep systems-disturbing water-of-life here. The drive of the eighth chapter of *ChrISt in History* was towards this disturbing aspect of serious re-search.¹⁵ Re-search in its full vigour is not searching successfully for something that was lost and is found: it is searching hopefully for something that has not been found, even if hidden in plain view. The particle that I write of is not a new short-lived minuscule entity: it is the particle ‘I’ that stares us in the face in regular print, the particle ‘I’ whose most immediate referent stares you in the brain-mirror in morning light.

I have placed the consideration of that ‘I’ in the religious context of Christianity here, but I have in mind the entire aggregate of Is that is the human group: “... each member, each group, indeed our whole host and its great pilgrimage, a wave in the eternal stream of human beings, of the eternal striving of the human spirit towards the East, towards Home...”¹⁶ Further I have placed that aggregate in the positive context of want, of luminous destiny, of self-guiding.

It is of immediate use to consider that placement in what can be thought of as a classical context, that of Thomas Aquinas’ reflections on destiny and want in the first 17 questions of the *Prima Secundae* of his *Summa*. You may note that the first 5 questions regard happiness, with a bridge question¹⁷ carrying one to the issue of the dynamics of wanting, an issue spelled out over questions 7-17. What you might muse over here is your continuity or discontinuity with this classical context. I am asking in fact for a re-search of the text, and the key word here is *your*.

But first it is as well to advert to the parallel with physics to which I have been appealing. In that realm one re-searches with the contemporary mindset, in present particle physics in terms of the standard model.¹⁸ So, the key word *your* throws you back into the central question, What is your standard model answer to the question regarding ‘I’ and ‘I’s wants? Nor is it sufficient here to have that answer as the presence of a belief, although this is a pretty complex issue.¹⁹ You sense, I hope, some trickiness in the situation? Let us take it in stages.

First there is the apparently simple problem of understanding Aquinas. It is worth quoting Lonergan’s view of the topic, and of his own attitude, quite fully—and a particular worth is presented in the footnote here. “The relevant data for the meaning of Aquinas are the written words of Aquinas. Inasmuch as one may suppose that one has a habitual understanding similar to that of Aquinas, no method or effort is needed to understand what Aquinas understood; one has simply to read, and the proper acts of understanding and meaning follow. But one may not be ready to make that assumption on one’s own behalf. Then one has to learn. Only by the slow, repetitious, circular labor of going over and over the data, by catching here a little insight and there another, by

following through false leads and profiting from many mistakes, by continuous adjustments and cumulative changes of one's initial suppositions and perspectives and concepts can one hope to attain such a development of one's understanding as to hope to understand what Aquinas understood and meant. Such is the method I have employed, and it has been on the chance that others also might wish to employ it that this book has been written."²⁰

But now, did you notice the catch in the previous paragraph? I wrote of "understanding Aquinas"; Lonergan writes of reaching "the meaning of Aquinas."

Our interest is in "lifting up the 'I'", the 'I' of the print, the 'I' whose immediate referent is mirrored in the morning. We turned to Aquinas to give us, or you, a lift, but a lift towards what? "The meaning of Aquinas" is at least ambiguous. There is the meaning of Aquinas to be reached by understanding Aquinas, who is, like everyone else, "hidden in a glass darkly." Then there is the meaning of Aquinas of which Lonergan writes. Which of these is our objective? The 'I' that is our goal is, alas, "hidden in a glass darkly." Aquinas is not a friar in a Noah's ark but a piccolo note in the symphony of history, and the want of the 'I' is a reach for that symphony.

But wherefrom this latter notion? Are we not evidently in a vicious hermeneutic circle? How do we lift the 'I'? We are, of course, in the presence of Hegel's insight and problem, as identified by Lonergan. "As the labor of introspection proceeds, one stumbles upon Hegel's insight that the full objectification of the human spirit is the history of the human race. It is in the sum of the products of common sense and common nonsense, of the sciences and the philosophies, of moralities and religions, of social orders and cultural achievements, that there is mediated, set before us the mirror in which we can behold, the originating principle of human aspiration and human attainment and failure. Still, if that vast panorama is to be explored methodically, there is a prior need of method."²¹

How, then, to proceed? We search and re-search not for what has been lost but for what has yet to be found. And in that re-search we take, so to speak, our best shot. Recall the remark above about checking out what is thought of as a classic. "What do you

want?’ ‘Master, where do you live?’” Aquinas has suggestions about living, being properly alive, as Aristotle had. And Aquinas nods, as he goes along in those first six questions, to Aristotle, Augustine, Boethius, and to the scriptural expressions of Jeremiah, John, Paul,²² other classics in an old and classic sense. But in the wings you have Epicurus and Nietzsche. Who am I to trust to find “what ‘I’ want?” Aquinas had some serious chaps nudging him. Who is nudging us, me, you?

But here we come on a new level to the question of continuity and discontinuity. Was Aquinas thinking genetically about these chaps, foreshadowing Hegel? It would seem that he was not doing so in any explicit manner. Nor, though he himself was in genetic mode,²³ was he explicit about that. But what of us, of you, now? No need here to expand on the emergence of explicit historical and genetic consciousness. There is an ethos of genetic consciousness that places us in discontinuity with Aquinas, an ethos regarding both ontogeny and phylogeny. But, alas, we must ask whether the ethos is more than skim deep. What is meant, in contemporary ontogenetic journals, by ‘cognitive development,’ ‘personality development’?²⁴ So, we come round again to the issue of standard model raised above at note 18.

Our first stage of reflection on re-searching ‘I’ has led us to a suspicion that adequate re-search calls for a mindset that is genetic, a mindset with a hold on the symphony of history. Yes, certainly one might luck out on meeting a master, but that does not give us a springboard out of the symphony. The 14⁺ billion-year-long symphony is, for one thing, massively genetic. And here, surely, is the rub, rubbing deeper? History presents the ‘I’ Incarnately divine, and the ‘I’ in print. Both have to be lifted up, and each piccolo person is invited to pipe history forward, a history in which the best is as yet to come. “What do you want?” Perhaps, like Newman, we must chant, “one step enough for me.”²⁵

Or we must advert luminously to the fact that the real data of history is not the search but the searchers.²⁶ And this is as true of physics as it is of piety, as valid for economics as it is for ecstasy. And that adverting, and its advertising, is to be a shocking leap in history.²⁷

Packaging the shock, oddly, could help, especially if the packaging is methodological, doctrinal, methodological doctrine. And that is precisely what I am about, about about about. We turn first to Lonergan's reflections on method. There is his elementary distinction in *Insight* between empirical method and generalized empirical method: "We have followed the common view that empirical science is concerned with sensibly verifiable laws and expectations. If it is true that essentially the same method could be applied to the data of consciousness, then respect for ordinary usage would require that a method, which only in its essentials is the same, be named generalized empirical method."²⁸ His orientation in that book was in fact towards something thematized later: "Generalized empirical method operates on a combination of both the data of sense and the data of consciousness: it does not treat of objects without taking into account the corresponding operations of the subject; it does not treat of the subject's operations without taking into account the corresponding objects."²⁹ In between these efforts of 1954 and 1974, there was his unpublished push in a sketched first chapter of *Method*. I quote rather fully, both since the typescript is not readily available to you and since the refinements mentioned are useful right through the present reading.

Intentionality is the presence of objects to a subject: of the spectacle to the spectator, of music to the listener, objects of thought to the thinker, of truths to the man that judges rightly, of objects of choice to the man that deliberates and chooses. Consciousness is presence to the subject (1) of the subject himself, (2) of his operations, and (3) of the connectedness of his operations.

Intentionality and consciousness are concomitant and distinct. They are concomitant, for any intentional operation is conscious and any conscious operation is intentional. They are distinct, for they differ qualitatively and, so to speak, occupy different dimensions of the same operation. Thus, when the spectacle is present to the spectator, the spectator is also present to himself, and so is his gazing; but the former *presence to* differs from the latter; the spectacle is present as object; the spectator is not part of the object, and yet he is not unconscious; he is present as the one that attends, while the object is present as what is attended

to. When music is present to the listener, the listener too is present to himself, and so also is his listening; but though simultaneously present, the listener and listening are no part of the music; their presence is, as it were, in another dimension that in no way obtrudes on the music or distracts from it; it is a presence that is not listened to but listens; and without that presence the music would be only sound-waves in the air and physiological effects upon the ear.

When objects of thought are present to the thinker, the thinker is present to himself and his thinking too is present to him; but they are present, not as further objects of thought to distract his attention, but as the origin and source whence objects of thought so submissively proceed to be distinguished, compared, combined, related, opposed, dismissed. Similarly, one might run through the whole list of our apprehensive and appetitive operations to discern in each the concomitance and the distinction of consciousness and intentionality, of subject and object. Distinct and concomitant, consciousness and intentionality are linked by the two bridges of continuity and introspection. There is the bridge of continuity between the conscious human subject and the body in which he is incarnate: consciously he may move his fingers, hands, arms: intentionally, he may watch his moving fingers, hands, arms. There is also the bridge of introspection: it is a shift of attention by which we advert to the data of consciousness. Such adverting is both conscious and intentional, but it is of a second order, for it supervenes upon a prior consciousness and intentionality. Second-order consciousness is the presence of the subject to himself as introspecting; second-order intentionality has a second-order object that in a first order is not an object but a datum of consciousness. Similarly, when as at present one introspects introspection, then there is a third-order consciousness, for consciously we advert to our adverting to our operations. There is a third-order intentionality whose third-order object was, in the second order, not an object but the datum of consciousness that is the introspection being introspected.³⁰

He never returned to that push, but in the final version of *Method* there is the mood of “The Ongoing Genesis of Methods.”³¹ It is the mood that I would associate with my interpretation of that

metagram of words on page 48 of *Method*: the third line, part of the good of order, yet somehow out beyond in a reach for a new ordering towards the unknown.³² Somehow? That is our present topic.

I have on various previous occasions sublated Lonergan's view of orders of consciousness into a view of methodology as the third order of consciousness. The sublation is worth including here, since it has a simple appearance that helps the climb towards new meaning.

Particular methods, then, belong to the second order of consciousness. One is doing physics at a certain period of history, and one's doing is self-digested. But physics at a different period has a different doing, and so gives rise to a different method.³³ Likewise with other genera and phyla of inquiry, of inquirers. So you may arrive at a notion of populations of methods, like the populations of animals. As the populations of animals give rise to the evolutionary science of zoology, so the populations of methods are to give rise, in the third stage of meaning, to the evolutionary science of method-ology.

This is the new ordering and the fresh defining of generalized empirical method of which I write. In its maturity, methodology's focus is the procedures of human spirits called *methods*. There is no longer a balance of subject and object, as in Lonergan's 1974 definition of generalized empirical method. The focus is on the **exigence** that is the human spirit in its concrete reality of aspiration.³⁴ One might say that the focus is on the subject as subject, but the **as** there must now be taken in a peculiar non-abstractive sense,³⁵ a sense that relates to the odd claim that in the fullest sense of our orientation God is not an object.³⁶

I am here reaching for something that is at the limit of my own efforts, yet, strangely it is also something that can become, in a post-systematic sense and in a later stage of meaning, as familiar as the setting sun, the shadow of the moon. "To what indeed shall I liken / The world and human life? / Ah, the shadow of the moon, / When it touches in the dewdrop / The beak of the waterfowl."³⁷ I think now of Schroedinger's popular lectures, given in Trinity College Dublin in the 1950s, titled "What is Life?" He himself was startled at the audience, increasing week by week, eager to sense his

reaching for the meaning of negentropy. Here we are struggling with negentropy at the height of the life of negentropic mind, struggling towards heuristic intimations that would be a counter to the horrors of the popular consciousness that dominates the warped science that is the substance of present studies of mind. Earlier, at note 8, I mentioned such studies and promised to return to the topic. I might do so now in terms of two cultures, but not the two cultures made popular by C.P. Snow. I speak of two possible popular consciousnesses, one integral the other schizothymic. Of course, I speak in riddles and of the future. I speak of the fruit of an implementation of methodological doctrines that have scarcely been formulated much less commonly heard of.³⁸ Integral consciousness is to be the fruit of generations and generators of functional specialization, of a slow emergence of that cosmopolis; schizothymic consciousness is a reality of present studies.

If you are with me in some way in your reading here, then you are open to a further intimation of the consciousness that I would have you brood over with whatever leisure is available to you. So: I add a paragraph or three here calling your attention to the present output of learned work in cognitive studies. What are these studies talking about, about about about? Are they talking about the exigence, the abyss that is the searcher and the searched? No doubt, there are legitimations and excuses, which you might well provide yourself. But what legitimates the exclusion of mind from the study of mind?³⁹

I can only invite you to bring your blood screams to the stacks of journals that stand guard over present conventions of science and education. Here I recall that first essay on “Classroom Reform,” with its two parts. A first part looks to reform “on the run,” a part that relates directly to the topic of the third essay, “How Might I become a Better Teacher?” The second part regards the long-term reform that could be brought about by serious functional collaboration. It is in the context of that part that these next few paragraphs stand.

But do not, for that reason, skip these next paragraphs. Yes, they point to a growing complexity of journal discourse about the nature, genesis, encouragement, transmission, disorders,

therapies, etc of cognition. But, curiously, the fundamental solution to the hidden problems in that complexity are simple, are as simple as the suggestions given in the previous essay and in part one of the first essay. But to that claim I must add that this simple solution does not remove the complexity: rather, it grounds a new controlling creative ordering of it. The fundamental solution is what I may call foundational. But getting there is dialectical, where I am using the word dialectical in a loose broad sense. Let me home in on three senses that relate to your reading of these few paragraphs.

There is a first loose sense if you are a teacher, or even a teacher of teachers. In both these cases what you need is not a plunge into the complexity, but simply a sense of the ongoing mess in your back-up system. It is the sort of sense that grounds a green revolution or a popular stand against nuclear proliferation, a shift of ethos. And that is the deeper issue. Read, then, but not beyond these paragraphs, into the journals, using them to supplement your motivation to face tasks of self-discovery related to the admission of self into classroom.

Now the deeper issue is the admission of self into research, etc. Here I come to a second sense of dialectic, one that is an initial personal puttering with the tasks sketched by Lonergan in his page on “The Structure of Dialectic.”⁴⁰ This second sense is one on which we focus in other essays,⁴¹ but here it means that you not only take, or enhance, a popular stand about the mess, but you attend to yourself sufficiently to articulate that stand, to take a somewhat luminous position on the mess. Then, you are back to an operative reading of the first article as opposed to the ‘normal’ reading that you may have given it previously, a normal reading dictated—yes, think of dictators!—by the present ethos of normal reading.

The third meaning of dialectic that I have in mind here, of course, is the meaning that belongs to the future, the meaning that belongs to the ordering of the mess that will lead, not to its simplification, but to its fruitful scientific complexification. And I would hope that some readers would push on towards a sense, a fantasy, of this meaning: that indeed, is the fundamental aim of this series and of my various other efforts, especially the push to be

identified operationally, pragmatically, elementarily, in some following *Joistings*, beginning at *Joistings 11*.

A first point, then, is my claim that we are dealing here, in the main, with a pre-scientific complexity, a sort of phlogiston chemistry gone wild. My claim, however, is based on a parallel in me to a fantasy about chemistry after Mendeleev. But might you share my fantasy a little? I expect no reader to rush immediately to the library to share my detailed search: though a few collaborators would be cherished.⁴² Think, for example, of the title “Subjective, Not Cognitive Psychology: The Revolutionary Theory of the Twenty-First Century.”⁴³ It is a title that you or I might like to have taken for our own efforts. But where does the content of the article come from and where does it go?

The article is certainly worth a serious read. Quill is writing in the context of a re-printing of his 1972 work, *Subjective Psychology: A Concept of Mind for the Behavioral Sciences and Philosophy*.⁴⁴ It swing through the ups and downs, since the end of the nineteenth century, of the search for the proper object and method of psychology, and it does so in a quite sharp fashion that I would not dream of summarizing here. He is rescuing his own work, associating it both with Whitehead and Ahnson, and lining up critically the oscillations of the various other perspectives on the experimentation, theory and practice of psychology in the past century. Perhaps you would profit from my repetition here of one of his key conclusions, after more than 30 pages of close argument. “The resolution of the problem of sufficient precision as it pertains to the issue of characterizing primary psychological units for experimental analysis is to be found in meticulously analysing the concept of a single mental event.”⁴⁵ “Analyzing the concept”: now where have we heard that before?⁴⁶ Nevertheless, the drive of his work and of Ahnson’s must be taken seriously. He is not, in fact, just analyzing a concept: but it would take a shift of his attention to the curious type of self-attention recommended by Lonergan for him to find that out, and thus to move to a beginning of the discovery of the primary psychological units for experimental analysis.⁴⁷

I switch attention now, rather randomly it would seem, to another title and article, in another tradition, *Behavior Modification*:

“Light on Body Image Treatment: Acceptance through Mindfulness.”⁴⁸ We are now in another tradition of research, perhaps more familiar to the reader. Still, the title gives you grounds to suspect that there is an edging forward of that tradition: the author is talking of mindfulness. As with the previous article, this article is certainly worth brooding over. In the previous instance I quoted from the conclusion: here I quote usefully from the summary at the beginning. “This approach fosters the idea that the treatment process should be one of observation, nonjudgment, neutrality, and acceptance. To this end, this article will depict the conceptualization of body image treatment from a mindful perspective, in which mindfulness serves as the foundation on which the multiple facets of treatment are built. The core components of body image treatment (i.e. cognitive, perceptual, behavioral, and emotional), in the context of mindfulness, are discussed as they relate to the treatment of body image disturbance. This article may be viewed as a theoretical overview of a new treatment concept for body image disturbance.”⁴⁹ I do not attempt any further effort at summary, but hover around a few points and pointers. Does the approach not sound close to that recommended by Lonergan? Read thus one is reading the past as “better than it was”; such hopefilled reading is part of dialectic.⁵⁰ I could quote abundantly from Stewart in this hopefilled vein.⁵¹ But there is an ironic and sad feedback situation here. Stewart writes of “cognitive filters”⁵² that cut off objective observation. Operative through her research and written work would seem to be a cognitive filter inherited within Stewart’s tradition: the expected filter of, well, of Scotus descendants. How would Scotus define mindfulness? Track back in history, or forward, and see.⁵³ Would Scotus’ ghost like the absence of any question mark from the entire essay?⁵⁴ Aristotle’s and our wonder, and the anxious wonder of the overweight patient are excluded from the thematic of theory, therapy, and treatment. The patient is guided and encouraged into “growth techniques such that an individual continues to evolve, not repeating the same patterns, but employing new observations, perceptions, thoughts, insights and behaviors.”⁵⁵ But what is meant by guiding, and what is it to employ new observations, and so on?⁵⁶

It is obvious that we could thus move around the journal holdings of any library in the area we have selected, reaching for [1] our sense of, or [2] our standing on, our topic: those two of the three meanings of *dialectic* that I mentioned. But I wish to twist our strategy so as to give a sense of, a fantasy of, the third meaning of *dialectic*: [3] the full global enterprise. Think now, not of two paragraphs, but of two weeks devoted to the work surrounding the two journals I selected, or beyond, to the whole caboodle of related journals.⁵⁷ Let me now go directly to my helpful parallel, which is to the two weeks that Bernard Lonergan devoted in 1957 to thinking disorders in *Phenomenology and Logic*.⁵⁸ His presentation was powerful in its coherence and its critical content. What was the core of that coherence and criticism? In a sense, it did not emerge luminously in the two weeks: so, in my privileged position as editor, I packed that core into Appendix A with its two diagrams of the dynamics of mental imaging, cognition, behavior modification.⁵⁹ Now, the question I wish you to raise is, What good did those lectures do then, what good, till now, their publication 44 years later?

What, then, is the worth of my two meager paragraphs? Or even of two weeks ranging across the scattered journals that deal with the limited phenomenology of imaging and the even more limited logic of behavior modification? The two weeks might well yield a volume entitled *Phenomenology and Logic of Cognition*: to what effect? So, let me carry us forward, perhaps with something more than a grin from you. “Purposeless laughter can dissolve honoured pretence; it can disrupt conventional humbug; it can disillusion man of his most cherished illusions.”⁶⁰

The second article I consider is, as I mentioned, followed by two others on “Multi- disciplinary Treatment of Eating Disorders.” Part 1 deals with “Structure and Costs of Treatment”; part 2 deals with “Primary Goals and Contents of Treatment.” Bear with me in my twisted paralleling. We are dealing in the present context with **Thinking Disorders**.⁶¹ My next article is part 1 of two on the topic “Multidisciplinary Treatment of Thinking Disorders” and indeed I could go with the title of the two articles noted. *Joistings II* could be considered as focused on the structure and cost of the treatment; *Joistings 12* attends to goal and content. Will my two

articles do any more good in relation to thinking disorders than the two articles of Stewart and Williamson did with regard to eating disorders? So we may wind round, with a grin, to the same point and page with which we concluded the previous paragraph. “Humour keeps the positions in contact with human limitations and human infirmity. It listens with sincere respect to the Stoic description of the Wise Man, and then requests an introduction. It has an honest admiration for the blueprints of Utopia, but it also has a vivid imagination that puts Tom and Dick and Harry in the unfamiliar roles. It questions neither aspirations nor ideals nor high seriousness nor earnest purpose nor self-sacrificing generosity; but it knows the difference between promise and fulfilment, and it refuses to calculate without men as they are, without me as I am. For if satire becomes red with indignation, humour blushes with humility.”⁶²

The humility lifts us forward to a better glimpse of the “Moral Impotence” which is the topic to follow in Lonergan’s book *Insight*. Perhaps, indeed, it lifts us forward, or back, to the question of some rescuing structure, some cosmopolis of global collaboration, some quite novel multidisciplinary treatment that would be satisfactory, some specialized auxiliary that would be beautiful in its efficiency.⁶³ You see where I am trying to lead you? Almost twelve years after he finished *Insight*, Lonergan leaped to the seed of that multidisciplinary beauty, which if it blushes with humility, it blushes unseen, unheard. The treatment is now available; its structure has been sketched: what is its cost? Well, we have to leave that topic to the later *Joistings* and to the collaborations that mesh with them. But I cannot resist the expression of my sadness, to stay with that same page of Lonergan’s *Insight*, that Lonergan’s solution of forty years ago, even within that group that claim discipleship, “tends to be shouldered out of the busy day.”⁶⁴ Perhaps my few twistings here will call you back from such a group, from such a day and daze, so that the challenge to you, to “what do you want?”, “will make its force felt in the tranquility of darkness, in the solitude of loneliness, in the shattering upheavals of personal or social disaster.”⁶⁵

For that is what we are dealing with here and now: the brutal destruction of your own days’ possibilities, the starvation of

mind and body that is the reality of our global tillage that seems darkly committed to continue the horror of serial killing, “the bondage of the blood” that is sustained by present institutions, roles, tasks of town and gown. So I steal, in a present commission, the “Commission” of Ezra Pound.

Go out and defy opinion,
Go against this vegetable bondage of the blood.
Be against all sorts of mortmain.⁶⁶

The commission is to reform one’s own private days, one’s struggle to teach and learn, one’s community of searchers and re-searchers.

So we find ourselves moving back to, in, round, the first essay of the series on education, on “Classroom Reform.” Yet, I would hope, not back but forward, even a little in a popular consciousness regarding minding that supplements the various rebellions against traditions of oppression of which Pound writes, rebellions that turn to the hope of new ages and new ecologies. Those traditions have no serious support other than a popular consciousness, for their scientific base is shabby, even when it is supported by respectable leaders in nations and religions.

Outside the culture of what are called “the hard sciences,” sciences that appeal to mathematics or molecular complexes, there prevails in our time a sick reductionism of evolution’s highest achievement. The oddity is that physics and chemistry are, not the “hard sciences,” but the easy sciences: another nudge towards turning within the search to the searchers. The genuinely hard and mystery-laden sciences are taken to be the obvious realm of common sense’s parliamentary procedures. So, a sick popular consciousness governs the talk and the tinkering of churches and governments, a sick popular consciousness that I have tried to highlight by a focus on various journals of cognition and education and their predominantly pre-scientific state. It is a popular consciousness that ravages due seriousness in human studies, that constitutes effete interest rather than effective *praxis*, staleness rather than adventure, committees rather than commitments. It governs our lives and preys

on our prayers. That popular consciousness cannot but be a molecular presence in your blood scream, preventing the screaming from becoming ordered dissent. So the human heart is held neatly and cleanly hostage by artificial desperation, and Augustine's reflections on the unseen heart takes on a fresh painfulness.

"If by 'abyss' we understand a great depth, is not man's heart an abyss? For what is there more profound than that abyss? Men may speak, may be seen by the operations of their members, may be heard speaking: but whose thought is penetrated, whose heart is seen into? What he is inwardly doing, or what purposing, what he is inwardly wishing to happen or not to happen, who shall comprehend? Do not you believe that there is in man a deep so profound as to be hidden to him in whom it is?"⁶⁷

And do you not believe this, in your blood-scream? Then "What do you want?" to do about it, or (about)³ it? The first *about* there refers to the personal possibility of changing your own classroom performance towards a larger gentleness with human loneliness; the second occurrence of *about*, (*about*)³, points to the larger challenge of transforming the global academy through small steps towards cyclic metaminding. I would have us and you shifting into a popular consciousness that brings into the classroom and the academy a green movement that stands against the sweet brutality of present conventions. There is a crisis, and the memory of the origin of the modern thematic identification of that crisis needs to be freshened, identified.⁶⁸ Forty years ago, Lonergan wrote: "what then is needed is a qualitative change in me, a shift in the centre of my existing from the concerns manifested in the *bavardage quotidien* towards the participated yet never in this completely established eternity that is tasted in aesthetic apprehension...."⁶⁹ I would have that aesthetic apprehension enlarged, personally and phylogenetically, not only into proximate origins but into the galactic billioning loneliness that has lifted us thus far. "Popular tradition, whether it be poetry, fiction, or acceptable history, is something essential to human living. It is what an existentialist would call an existential category. It is a constitutive component of the group as human. It is an aesthetic apprehension of the group's origin. The aesthetic apprehension of the group's origin and story becomes

operative whenever the group debates, judges, evaluates, decides, or acts—and especially in a crisis.⁷⁰

Do you, might you, accept and intussuscept that there is a crisis? Bernard Lonergan pointed towards that crisis, for the fifty years between 1934 and 1984,⁷¹ but in gentle under-read prose, growing exponentially in remoteness of meaning.⁷² My little essay, the end of several series yet a present hope of fresh collaboration, draws attention in a final sweeping way to his luminous and our dulled exigence for the second time of humanity.⁷³ The sweep emphasizes a few zones of contemporary agony, such as the muddled methods of truncated psychology in this past century. “What do you want?” Does Akhter Ahsen point forward with an efficient methodological answer? “What we want is, indeed, in the future. We who are reflected in the past are always waiting in the present, as a magical receptacle of desire. The past and the present are reflected in a futuristic sociology of pure consciousness to be.”⁷⁴ Does he not sound, read, as a representative of new hope? Rather does he and his school represent a mythic receptacle of desire that is no doubt sincere, hardworking, but that is in deepest fact a blocking of that self-embrace that would fill our lonely molecules with mindfulness.

It is quite clear to me, after fifty years of grappling with Lonergan’s fifty years, that only functional collaboration, in its all-inclusive cycling of a sloping dialectic of present alienated studies,⁷⁵ can bring us beyond axial blindness into a global molecular self-radiance of the question, “What do you want?”

Notes

¹ *Jn* 1:38. These are the first words of Jesus in John’s Gospel. *Joistings 3* gives an elementary reflection on the amazing methodological neglect of this question. Making that question self-luminous is the core of our challenge to escape axial darkness: but I am anticipating in these words the push of my essay.

² The *Joistings* series is a continuing reflection, begun in 2005, on foundational matters, available on the Website www.philipmcs Shane.ca.

³That most recent perspective emerged in the final two days of my August 2005 lectures in the University of British Columbia. The focus of attention then was on the meaning of ‘I’ as used by Jesus and by you, and, in a somewhat Origenist mood, I went on to over-interpret the modified statement “And I, if ‘I’ be lifted up from the earth”(Jn 12:32). The context was the 13.7 billion year story of matter and earth that give rise to the phantasm ‘I’ (*watashi wa*, whatever) as it emerges in the reader of John. The cosmic book, open at ‘I,’ invites the lift towards the Idea.

To those familiar with my Website book, *ChrISt in History*, this reaches deep into the problem of an adequate categorial context, intimated best by bracketing the *abouts* of the text sentence as (about)³. Section 2 of *Joistings 1* deals with the topic. *Joistings 1*, indeed, was an Introduction to the series, written in the Spring of 2005, but it seemed as well now, after an August conference on functional specialization in Christology, from which emerged the Website book, *ChrISt in History*, to add another introduction, named *Joistings 0*.

⁴*Joistings 0*, page 1.

⁵In *Joistings 2* there is a discussion, in section 2, of different meanings of *about* that we return to here when we consider orders of consciousness below (at note 30). Briefly, there is the spontaneous procedure of “going about one’s business” without any serious thematic of that going-about. If that going-about is thematized, then one arrives at a particular method related to that particular procedure, which one might label “(about)²”. But there is then possible the emergence of a study, which obviously turns out to be historical and geographic, of the populations of methods, of “(about)²”s, that can be called methodology, or quaintly but helpfully, “(about)³”.

⁶One finds illustrations of divine self-searching in the expressions of primitive religiosity, where the divinity, although thought of as fundamentally singular, One, is envisaged as self-searching, self-addressing, brooding over the waters, seeing that “it was very good” (*Genesis* 1:31).

⁷This is an enormously complex issue that relates e.g. to R.E. Whitson’s hope of *The Coming Convergence of World Religions* (New York: Newman, 1971). Part of that convergence, in the long-term dialectic of humanity, relates to “the genesis of adequate self-knowledge” (B. Lonergan, *Insight*, chapter 17, section 1.2) that is mediated by the global emergence of theoretic consciousness and a concomitant critical consciousness. That genesis, at present, is most manifest in the Christian tradition. The afore-mentioned book, *Insight*, evidences such a contemporary and future dynamic in a

manner that gives expression to a general categorial view that “in the twenty sixth place, God is personal” (*Ibid.* 690), whatever the complexity of that personality or personalities.

⁸ Kataphatic prayer, a contemplative stance that grounds a speaking that communicates understanding, is part of the emergence of the adequacy mentioned in the previous note. At present it does not occupy centre-stage in any of the high religions. The effort at togetherness that dominates contemporary consciousness, semi-theoretic or popular, is more associable with an emphasis on mystery, negativity, Zen-like stances.

⁹ This is a general interesting exercise. You may recall an exercise I used to give my students: check the indices in the university bookstore texts that deal with education, psychology, children etc. What is in the index under *Q*? The exercise can become much more complex however, depending on your grip on the metaphysical equivalents e.g. of interrogatives. See below, at note 54. In the present case one can begin by checking the content of the article to detect whether the mark in the title marks luminously.

¹⁰ There is a meaning of *register* given by Karen Horney that is relevant to the present discussion. “For the sake of avoiding repetitious explanations I shall use the term ‘register’ when I mean that we know what is going on within us without our being aware of it” (*The Neurotic Personality of our Time* [New York: Norton, 1937] 60). Below I shall talk of consciousness operating in the mode of writing in the learned journals mentioned as a neurotic mode, as a schizothymia that suppresses—with some degree of acceptable discomfort—what I call *blood-screams*. Horney’s elementary suggestion needs a great deal of refinement, mediated by neurochemistry, something quite beyond us here. But you may still puzzle over various types of awareness, especially a lurking awareness of “splits” that “go on” in our teaching, our teachers’ meetings, our conventions of talk about teaching. My concern here is with what is conventionally registered in the molecules of present minding, and the minding of minding: a popular culture of investigative consciousness that requires a critical heightening of awareness.

¹¹ We do not touch here on the tradition that leads up to Husserl and beyond, but we will be noticing that talk of the subject does not mean non-neglect of the subject. On Husserl, there is of course Lonergan’s work in *Phenomenology and Logic*. Below we shall be brushing past the work of Akhter Ahsen. “Ahsen considers Husserl’s phenomenology and Husserl’s way of relating to the eidetic as too reductionist” (p. 19 of a volume-length survey of Ahsen’s work titled “Image and Word in Ahsen’s Image Psychology” by Judith Hockman, the assistant editor of the journal in

which the article appears, *Journal of Mental Imagery* **26** [2002] 1-146). Ahsen's work would seem a serious shift to the subject, but it is blinded by cognitive filters. On cognitive filters see the text at note 52 below. Judith Nochman's "Ahsen's Image Model of Education" (*Journal of Mental Imagery* **27** [2003] 150-194) adds a further context relevant to our present reflections.

¹² All three, and the present article, are in the journal *Divyadaan: Journal of Philosophy and Education*: [1] "The Reform of Classroom Performance," **13** (2002) 279-309; [2] "The Wonder of Water. The Legacy of Lonergan," **15** (2004) 457-475; [3] "How do I Become a Better Teacher?" **17** (2006) 201-218; [4] the present essay. [3] and [4] are also available as *Joistings 9* and *Joistings 10*. [1] and [2] are also available on the Website, [1] as the concluding part of Cantower 6 (pp. 18-51) and [2] as part of Cantower 27 (pp. 16ff).

¹³ The book, *ChriSt in History*, emerged prior to the conference of August 15-19 in University of British Columbia: ten chapters for ten hours of presentation. It was made available beforehand, so the lectures in fact were expansions on various topics. The present essay touches on some of these expansions. The book is available free on www.philipmcshane.ca.

¹⁴ *Introducing Critical Thinking* by John Benton, Alessandra Drage and Philip McShane (Halifax: Axial Press, 2005). The text, written for grad 12 in Canada, is in fact now being used in university courses.

¹⁵ Central to that chapter was a drawing of attention to a concluding section of Bernard Lonergan's Doctrinal consideration of Trinitarian theology (to appear shortly in English translation as the 11th volume of his *Collected Works* [Toronto: University of Toronto Press] under the title *The Triune God. Doctrines*) where Lonergan invites a fuller reading of scripture. The disturbing aspect of that fuller reading can be noticed now by returning to the title of the essay, which included quotation marks. The title is in fact a quotation from *Jn* 1:38, the first words attributed to Jesus in that Gospel. How does one read them, and—in the complex context of Lonergan's fuller view—their metaphysical equivalents? Not many advert to, register, the challenge of self-attention that would bring into luminous possession the dynamics of human doing.

¹⁶ Herman Hesse, *The Journal to the East* (London, 1970) 12.

¹⁷ The bridge question, *Quaestio 6*, about the voluntary and the involuntary, about animals and humans, is enormously complex, needing now the push from description to explanation that contemporary neurochemical studies invites. Note 56 below intimates that larger context.

¹⁸I think here of the Standard Model as opposed to the present struggle towards perspectives suggested by e.g. string theory.

¹⁹A context is *Insight* on “Belief,” 707-713[728-735]. The zone of self-attention and self-discovery might be, naively, considered as one where one can get beyond belief to science, since the data, the thematization and the verification and implementational possibilities are “close” to the subject. But one is caught in one’s cultural tradition, which, will the best will in the world, can filter off serious attention to either consciousness or intentionality (see the text at note 30 below). This is true of the authors in cognitive sciences that we consider here. But it can be true of a sincere disciple of Lonergan. It is especially possible and true when the research and writing are about (that peculiar word!) the other as conscious and intentional.

²⁰B. Lonergan, *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) 222-223. A worth of quoting this text fully above is the possibility of you considering the parallel between it and the fuller strategy of reading Aquinas that is sketched on page 250 of *Method in Theology*.

The hope of the writer of *Verbum* was ill-founded, but that later book presents a doctrine of group, indeed, global, procedure that, in its full operation will be unavoidable even by the journalers of cognition. I have been trying for some years now to draw the attention of Lonergan scholars to the block of Aquinas mentioned before note 17, as part of the road to communicating with the journalers. I have no doubt that Lonergan applied his personal method to that block of *Quaestiones* [see the index to *Grace and Freedom*] but his hurried finishing of *Insight* prevented him from elaborating on it in his own style. It would be sad if we had to wait for *Method’s* page 250 “embarrassment” (see *ibid.* 299) to get his followers to move into that core self-discovery. Obviously I am touching on a huge problem here of truncation. The journalers of cognition are just one truncated group. So, for example, my reading of recent journaling regarding the Jesuit *Ratio Studiorum* of 1599 showed me a like truncation, but more sweetly presented. In reflection on education it is simply not enough to entertain in commonsense fashion that first question of Jesus: for education calls for the sharing with the generations to come the character and conditions of that core dynamic. Perhaps some of my readers might turn their attention to the journalers of economics, in the context of Lonergan’s challenge to the established stupidity of present theory and practice? “Coming to grasp what serious education is and, nonetheless, coming to accept that challenge constitutes the greatest challenge to the modern

economy” (Lonergan, *Macroeconomic Dynamics: An Essay in Circulation Analysis* [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999] 119).

²¹I quote from page 14 of a Lonergan archival file labelled A697. It contains a typescript numbered pp. 8-23. Very plausibly it is a continuation of the sketch of a first chapter of *Method* to be found in File V.7, a file dating from February of 1965 which contains the ‘discovery pages’ of functional specialization. That file contains a full handwritten sketch of a first chapter of *Method*, and nine typed pages of its beginning. See Darlene O’Leary, Lonergan’s *Practical View of History* (Halifax: Axial Press, 2006).

²²Notice the male listing. The shift to post-axial times demands a creative surge of feminism. A context is Alessandra Drage, *Thinking Woman* (Cape Breton: Axial, 2005).

²³Lonergan’s researchings on Aquinas’ views of grace and mind illustrate this abundantly.

²⁴The massively tricky question, “What is a development?” should bubble up here. For a beginning to its heuristic answer see the text following that “key sentence” of *Insight* 464[489] mentioned and quoted below in note 47. The search for the meaning of development has to be followed up in that mood, that mode.

²⁵The conclusion of the first verse of Newman’s hymn, “Lead Kindly Light” written on 16 June 1833.

²⁶There is a further depth to this in an absolutely supernatural order, such as is claimed thematically by Christian theology, which I can do no more than mention here, though it changes entirely the context of our discussion of ‘I.’ Such an order places the organic spirit that is humanity in a zone of transvaluation of meaning (see *Method in Theology* 106) that stretches the boggled mind to thin analogies close to equivocation, cousin perhaps both to Plotinus and to Hindu reachings. The lower ground of loneliness that is the empirical residue twines into the upper ground in a manner that turns the organic achievement of the cosmos into most improbable immortal diamond.

The thematic pivots on the apprehension of what is due to the divine I that is also an organism. A context here is “Grace: The Final Frontier,” chapter 7 of McShane, *The Redress of Poise*, a website book.

²⁷The leap has an economic core that would ground a new leisure, a new contemplative human living dominated luminously by what-ing, what-to-do-ing. Two pointers may help, from Lonergan’s reflections on apparently static yet genuinely leasured elements in culture, taken from *For a New Political Economy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998). “The

first difficulty is psychological. The static phase is a sombre world for men brought up on the strong drink of expansion. They have to be cured of their appetite for making more and more money that they may have more money to invest and so make more money and have more money to invest. They have to be fitted out with a mentality that will aim at and be content with a going concern and a standard of living. It is not an easy task to effect this change for, as the Wise Man saith, the number of fools is infinite.”(98) Despite Keynes’ title of 1936, the problem in the mid-thirties was not employment but leisure. “Such leisure may indeed be wasted, just as anything else can be wasted. But if it is properly employed, then it yields the cultural development that effects a new transformation.”(22)

²⁸ *Insight* 72[96].

²⁹ *A Third Collection* 141, the top five lines.

³⁰ I quote from a file labeled V.7, the one which contains the leap to functional specialization on February 1965. The file is reproduced as chapter 2 of Darlene O’Leary, *Lonergan’s Practical View of History* (Halifax: Axial Press, 2006). The section I quote from is from pages 6-8 of a nine-page typescript that is the beginning of a first chapter on Method (so titled). There is a full scribbled sketch of the entire chapter in the file. See also note 21.

³¹ The title of a lecture written in the mid-1970s. See *A Third Collection* (New York/Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1985) 146-165, and the note at the end of page 164.

³² The present essay leads to a more refined reading of the display of p. 48 of *Method in Theology* 48. There is the unknown reach of liberty, the principle of progress (*Insight* 234[259]), a freshened appreciation of the dynamics of personal relations, finite and infinite, a grounding of a fuller view of the dynamics of the physico-chemical capacity and need for eschatological integrity and radiance.

³³ The same is true of any field of inquiry. Three of the articles in psychology cited here— those by Hockman (note 11), Hiller (note 39) and Quill (note 43)—give a decent impression of the dialectic of method in psychology over the previous century. Aesthetics and history are evident zones of changing methods of progress and its analysis. And one can take seriously Felix Klein’s claim that mathematics changes its method every decade.

³⁴ See the index of *Phenomenology and Logic*, under *Exigence*.

³⁵ Lonergan’s reflections (*Phenomenology and Logic*: see the index under *subject*) on subject as subject is a broad indication of the problem, but it is a deep cultural problem with which we deal in an oblique way in the

present essay. Can one break through cognitive filters to the foundational reality (see *Method in Theology* 270) that is the subject? Can one at least place these filters, on-going shots at a totally concrete metaphysics, in a helpful heuristic sequence? Does not the exigence of which we write, the abyss (see the quote at note 67), whisper to us darkly the hidden truth of “critical method, method with respect to the ultimate” (*Insight* 686[708]) that God is not an object? And does not this raise questions regarding the ultimate fate of the neurochemistry of imagery?

³⁶ *Method in Theology* 342.

³⁷ A haiku of Dogen, a Zen Master who died in 1253.

³⁸ Chapters 5 and 6 of *ChrISt in History* open up the topic.

³⁹ Here I mention a journal to which I have referred to already (note 11): *The Journal of Mental Imagery*, which has been around for about thirty years. It represents a fermenting research and thinking that is on the edge of mind and minding, a ferment associated with the work of its editor, Akhter Ahsen. An interested reader might get a sense of my point and the related gap by tackling Hillel A. Schiller, “Modernizing Educational Reform: The Eidetic Stance” *Journal of Mental Imagery* 27 (2003) 1-41. You might like to ponder the question of exclusion in a particular case, an exclusion that leaves the entire enterprise of psychology and sociology in a basic darkness. It is the exclusion of the question, What is a word? The question can only be answered by the slow exercising of self-attention that would reveal to you what happened to Helen Keller, and to you at an earlier age, at the end of her five weeks with Annie Sullivan. For a beginning see McShane, *A Brief History of Tongue* (Halifax: Axial Press, 2000) 34-37.

⁴⁰ *Method in Theology* 249-50.

⁴¹ It has, of course, been a regular topic throughout the *Cantowers* and the later essays. See, for example, *Quodlibet* 8.

⁴² I have been encouraging functional collaboration for some time, and begin the search for collaborators with fresh seriousness in 2006. But I think it worth a few lines to talk of a significant beginning of this final article, a walk-about that I did, after the August 2005 conference, among the some 200 journals in various disciplines available in the University of British Columbia. That entire corpus, and the recurrence-schemes of its ongoing genesis, is dominated by a present ethos of truncated and fragmented consciousness. Think now, concretely, of the problem of metaphysics. Where are the present founders? A help here is “Founders of New York” (Cantower 14, section 4). See, then, my final paragraph of this essay and footnote 75 there. I see no other way than functional collaboration to an integral heuristic normative notion of the ongoing

genesis of progressive disciplinary and multi-disciplinary journal contributions. Here are the beginnings of collaboration: the difficult task of fantasy undertaken, perhaps starting with a walk-about around library journals musing over that strange definition of metaphysics that Lonergan gives (*Insight* 391, end lines; [416, end lines]) but now shifted into the large context that places its operation in global specialties 4 and 5.

⁴³William G. Quill, *Journal of Mental Imagery* **23** (1999) 117-152. To be cited as Quill.

⁴⁴(New York: Spartan-Macmillan, 1972). I invite you to follow the temptation to consider that here I am trying to revitalize a book printed in the same year, Lonergan’s *Method in Theology*, which expresses a concept of minding for the behavioral sciences and philosophy.

⁴⁵Quill 149.

⁴⁶This is a large topic, handled summarily by Lonergan in a footnote of *Verbum. Word and Idea in Aquinas* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) note 126 of page 39. “The Scotist rejection of insight into phantasm necessarily reduced the act of understanding to seeing a nexus between concepts; hence, while for Aquinas understanding precedes conceptualization which is rational, for Scotus understanding is preceded by conceptualization which is a matter of metaphysical mechanics.” Etc. One travels up through both idealism and empiricism to present views of minding and mindfulness and present English usage of the word *concept*.

⁴⁷“The curious type of self-attention” throws us back to the lengthy quotation at note 30 above. The problem of units, however, is a larger and very difficult issue. It would be helpful to begin with the problem of units of evolutionary theory as I discussed then in *Randomness, Statistics and Emergence* (Dublin: Gill and MacMillan, 1970; Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971), chapter 10. There the units are shown to be, not genes but recurrence-schemes. Helpful too is the reflection on the nature of virtue in *Quodlibet* 3, where I point to the relevance of flexible schemes grounded in forms or laws. The key text there, and in the present topic, is *Insight* 464[489]. The whole page and its context is a massive program for future work, quite beyond the present ethos in this or other journals. A single sentence, focusing on botanical complexity only, gives the future mood. “There have to be invented appropriate symbolic images of the relevant chemical and physical processes; in these images there have to be grasped by insight the laws of the higher system that account for regularities beyond the range of physical and chemical explanation; from these laws have to be constructed the flexible circle of schemes of recurrence in which the organism functions; finally, this flexible circle of schemes

must be coincident with the related set of capacities-for-performance that previously were grasped in sensibly presented organs.” This is not stuff for present elementary texts but for future graduate theses in various departments.

⁴⁸ Tiffany M. Stewart, *Behavior Modification* **28** (2004) 783-811. This November issue is devoted to Eating Disorders. Tiffany Stewart is also involved in the two articles that follow, which would provide interesting extended reading, “Multidisciplinary Treatment of Eating Disorders,” parts 1 and 2. To these I return shortly. I here quote the initial article as Stewart.

⁴⁹ Stewart 783.

⁵⁰ See *Method in Theology* 251.

⁵¹ It is worthwhile to think of this type of reading, or over-reading, in relation to the elementary description of interpretation given in *Method in Theology* 156-165. Here, one may understand the object, Stewart, better than the author, and mis-read, over-read, her meaning for words that point to the cultivation and practice of mindfulness. The over-reading can turn the article into a quite inspiring work. See, further, note 53 below.

⁵² Stewart 792.

⁵³ See note 46 above, placed in the context of notes 47 and 56 here.

⁵⁴ There is no question mark in the essay: it does not occur either as a marker or as a thematic topic. The words *questioning, asking, provide cues, curious, listen, facilitate planning* occur, and there is the title word, regularly repeated, *mindfulness*. One might ask, What is mindfulness? And one might answer, yes, **What?** is mindfulness. So there is a sad irony about the concluding sentence of the article: “The cultivation of mindfulness may be the key to unlocking the ability to let go of judgment and find acceptance, not just with the body, but with the whole person” (Stewart 810).

⁵⁵ Stewart 796.

⁵⁶ One “and so on” is evidently the text above that follows. In particular there is the paragraph beginning “the second article” which points to a parallel between eating disorders and thinking disorders. The parallel goes deeper than one might expect, deeply into issues concerning body-image and the ethos of present discourse that would have that imaging trapped in muddles regarding an already-out-there-now body and brain. (On this see *Insight*, especially chapter 8; Cantower 9 puts the problem in the fuller context of personal philosophic growth). It seems to me of vital and central importance to break forward into an imagery that is grounded in neurochemistry: but this is a topic for advanced metaphysics, for later

essays in *Joistings*. Still, it could be useful to pause over the notion that a particular human question is a micro-flexible scheme-structured pattern of chemical activities; the structures change in the transitions to insights and formulations and formulae, and do so differently in different languages. Now you might return to the peculiarity of Stewart’s non-use of question marks (see note 54 above). The important point in regard to a future of scientific dialogue is that a fuller imagery can lead to the discovery that the metaphysical equivalents of questions— chemodynamic patterns— focus various schools of psychology and philosophy on common psycho-organic realities, whatever the marks within their formulae. An instance of that fuller imagery could help here. Think, then, of the compound word *body-image* mentioned in this note and central to Stewart’s topic. One may not have too much trouble in imaging the body as a hierarchy of physics, chemistry, etc. But how about the word *image*? How many Aristoteleans or Thomists think and image the reality called *phantasm* as a layered hierarchic physico-chemical dynamic?

⁵⁷ The boodle, the estate of related journals, is a scattered reality revealed by their odd locations on shelves, in reference systems, etc etc. Indeed, the distribution reveals the aversions and allegiances that are part of the present comedy of narrow field specializations: the philosopher of morals just does not want to brush with the chemistry of virtue. The shift to honesty and efficiency pivots on the emergence of functional specialization that slopes disciplines into each other in history and dialectics so that common foundational realities and thematics move into creative control of disciplinary progress, grounding a shift in the statistics of schizothymia in gown and town.

⁵⁸ *Collected Works*, vol. 18 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001).

⁵⁹ The key diagrams are on pages 322-3. Appendix A is a shortened version of the original Appendix A, which is available as chapter 5 of *Lack in the Beingstalk. A Giants Causeway* (Cape Breton: Post-Axial Press, 2005). The original appendix was removed as a concession to the demands of the publisher’s readers.

⁶⁰ B. Lonergan, *Insight* 626[649].

⁶¹ Recall the subtitle of the related volume of *Behavior Modification*: “THIS ISSUE IS DEVOTED TO **Eating Disorders**” (sic).

⁶² You may be wondering at my lengthy quotations from this short section of *Insight* on humour, which sits between a discussion of effective conditions of freedom and reflections on moral impotence. But add the context of the character of the needed cosmopolis from the end of chapter 7 of that book, and sniff the high seriousness of the movement that claims

allegiance to Lonergan's achievement. There is ample room for satire and humour. And embarrassment. "Doctrines that are embarrassing are not to be mentioned in polite company" (*Method in Theology*, 299). I am certainly not being polite here in my emphasis on the explanatory demands of his later view of generalized empirical method, on his functional specialist solution to the shambles of the present pretenses of thinking. Was there something of this impoliteness in Lonergan's comments, in *Phenomenology and Logic*, on the failure of schools of great thinkers? (See there, 129, 281, 252-3; see also *Insight* 417[442]). See also the following concluding notes.

⁶³ Bring together the perspective of Lonergan, *Topics in Education*, 160, line 16, with his reflections "in the 31st place" of chapter 20 of *Insight*.

⁶⁴ *Insight* 625[648].

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ An extract from "Commission" by Ezra Pound, *Selected Poems* (London: Faber, 1939) 97. I quote at greater length from *Commission* in the Interlude following the Prologue to *Music That Is Soundless* (1969; revised edition Axial Press, Cape Breton, 2005). Obviously, the quotation is of general significance. But the reality of the present writing is that I am appealing more directly to the group of readers who wish to take Lonergan's suggestion seriously. So, this note ties in with notes 42 and 75. Some few must step out of line, the line of Lonerganism, and move towards I-ism: "unless 'I' be lifted up" "What do you want?" An I-ism that is Cosmicism, or a frogspond? Of course, I am actually talking about the challenge of getting into line with Lonergan's central discovery of the humbling need for functionally differentiated consciousness. And here, I hope that you "may not be afraid to laugh" (*Insight* 626[649]).

⁶⁷ Augustine, commenting on Psalm 49.

⁶⁸ Obviously, the primary target for freshening in this article is the zone identified nominally in the title: locating that naming in its self-reference within the comprehension of the diagrams named in Appendix A of *Phenomenology and Logic*. Then, so slowly, all one's self-reading is transformed by a luminous core of a behavior left dark by both behaviorism and Lonerganism.

⁶⁹ B. Lonergan, Review of J. Chaix-Ruy, *Les Dimensions de l'être et du temps*, *Gregorianum* 36 (1955) 138.

⁷⁰ B. Lonergan, *Topics in Education* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993) 230. We are here close to the hearts—literally—of "the problem of general history, which is the real catch" (*Ibid.* 236). It is the problem that is heuristically contextualized by the first section of chapter 17 of *Insight*.

⁷¹ Here my primary reference is to the final chapter of *ChrIst in History* where I parallel the two periods of history, 325-384 and 1935-1984.

⁷² Exponential adult growth is normative in genius, but it is to become normative generally in the third stage of meaning, with a much higher statistics of success than Maslow’s “less than 1% of adults grow” of the twentieth century. However, the shift cannot be expected to be abrupt. Might we expect the end of this century to bring it to < 2%? With a shift to cyclic global collaboration the statistics of emergence could reach a dazzling 12% in this millennium.

⁷³ Lonergan’s third stage of meaning can be identified with his second time of humanity as treated by him in his systematics of the Trinity.

⁷⁴ I quote from the volume-length survey of Ahsen’s work titled “Image and Word in Ahsen’s Image Psychology” by Judith Hockman, *Journal of Mental Imagery* 26 (2002) 19.

⁷⁵ So, in this final footnote, I refer back to its companion footnote 42, to the problem of collaboration, to the larger problem of lifting that collaboration towards a global functionality.

At the beginning of this essay I wrote of its readability out of the context of previous essays and books. But obviously, that context gives meaning to the manner in which disciplinary studies slope towards each other, converge towards a common dialectic and foundations, etc. However, in the next essays—*Joistings 11* and *Joistings 12* (www.philipmcshane.ca)—I move forward as much as possible in the same pattern of non-dependence on my previous searchings regarding the dynamics of omnidisciplinary collaboration. I hope for collaborative input and suggestions as I struggle with this advance into humble beginnings of functionality. I do not expect profound advanced thinking, but you may surprise yourself by the profundity of questions and suggestions springing out of your own area of expertise. I recall now the way Lonergan reached out at the end of “Finality, Love, Marriage” in 1943. “In accordance with the author’s wish, it is planned to make this article a starting point of a discussion, with a view to clarifying and developing its contribution to the theory of marriage.” (See *Collection* [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988] 263, note x). The Holy Office put a damper on the discussion. As far as I know, the Holy Office has not yet caught on to the dangers of the marriage of theology to global searchings through functional specialization. If you don’t tell, I won’t tell! So, let’s have a humble go at it: my e-mail is pmcshane@shaw.ca. Of course, communication with me is not a necessity: you might well begin by reviewing, in the mood of the “first principle of criticism” (*Insight* 588[611]), something you wrote: you

may have a meager notion of the universal viewpoint, and enough of a glimpse of functionality to sniff out possibilities. Still, **that** could be worth an exchange.