

**EXPANDING CHALLENGE TO AUTHENTICITY IN
INSIGHT: LONERGAN'S HERMENEUTICS OF
FACTICITY (1953-1964)**

Fred Lawrence

1. The Hermeneutics of Facticity

On his path to *Sein und Zeit*'s hermeneutics of facticity, Martin Heidegger picked up from Augustine that the human being is a question to him- or herself. In his 1921 lecture course on *Confessions*,¹ Book X, he saw that what determines the answers we discover to the question that we are for ourselves is our loving. Our concrete knowledge of what the Gospel of Luke calls "the one thing needful" is only disclosed by our loving. What we love massively conditions our concrete solution to the problem of living together. This insight is played off against the distantiating knowledge that parallels Husserl's bracketing of the natural attitude. Heidegger insists that Husserlian phenomenology is inadequate to the problem of self-knowledge that plunges us to foundations deeper than and prior to the distinction between philosophy and theology. However, what Heidegger learned from Augustine was truncated. His lectures concentrated on human living in its dimension of fallenness (*Verfallenheit*), dwelling a great deal on life as *tentatio* or testing, temptation, and on life as burdened by *molestia*, which he translated as *Faktizität*. Thus he examined mainly the section of Book X devoted to obstacles to the self-knowledge required for *confessio*, namely, the disordered desires (*libidines*) caused by concupiscence.² Augustine's tracing of happiness, and the role assigned by Augustine to the truth either as true judgment or as the opposite of lying almost disappears from Heidegger's treatment of *cura* (*Bekümmern*). Nevertheless, the Augustinian themes Heidegger did appropriate reappeared in the structure of *Being and Time*, having been stripped of their theological and dialogical context in the preparatory interpretations of Aristotle (especially the *Nicomachean Ethics*)³ in the elaborations of the hermeneutics of facticity⁴ before 1927.

Once *Being and Time* consolidated the removal of the hermeneutics of facticity from any specifically religious or Christian context, then *Dasein's* care or concern (*Sorge*) becomes dominated by fear and anxiety. Instead of Augustine's being-in-the-presence-of-God, the human being's death-dominated horizon is a being-in-the-presence-of-nothingness. Ironically, the philosopher who had deconstructed the modern horizon sufficiently to read ancient authors such as Aristotle and Augustine on their own terms, thereby located the hermeneutics of facticity firmly within the horizon defined by Thomas Hobbes: the fear of death. Even so, Heidegger succeeded in making hermeneutics as the self-interpretation of *Dasein* in its facticity a central and lasting theme of contemporary philosophy.

1.1 Lonergan's Hermeneutics of Facticity

A possible candidate for Lonergan's primer on "hermeneutics of facticity" appears in *De Deo Trino* in a section about "the analogy of the times of the subject."⁵ It concentrates upon the human being as a temporal subject (which is what *Dasein* is), whose intellectual nature is a higher integration of his material (organic and psychic) nature. In the genus of intelligences, human intelligence is a potency that normally is only actuated in relation to data as presented by the senses or represented by the imagination. As time goes on, this infinite potency is informed whenever we inquire about sensible presentations and imaginative representations and grasp causes in the sensible things; then we can conceive the understood intelligibilities in one or another degree of abstraction. This potency is actuated whenever we reflect on what we have formulated, ask whether it is so, weigh the evidence, form speculative or practical judgments, and choose in accord with our judgments. Lonergan says that insofar as we exercise properly intellectual functions without explicitly intending to do so or without realizing what the proper norms and exigences of intelligence are, we are as human beings only accidentally the subjects of an actuated intelligent nature. Our intelligence is only operating spontaneously. No one can explicitly intend to actuate their intellectual natures unless they already explicitly know that they possess such a nature; and they

can never know this until that intellectual nature is already actuated. Being-in-the-world precedes understanding, judging, and deciding about what that means, and of course we have to perform before we can reflect on our performance. Adequate self-knowledge is a matter of time.

In *De Deo Trino*'s account of the movement in human life from the spontaneous time of human living to the autonomous time of human living, Lonergan stresses that the explicit intention to govern one's operations in accord with the exigences proper to one's intellectual nature is a matter not just of understanding and affirming those demands, but of approving and choosing them. He thus makes thematic something left implicit in *Insight*'s chapter on "The Self-Affirmation of the Knower."⁶ When Lonergan brought this issue up expressly in the section on "Appropriating the Truth" in chapter 17,⁷ he did not warn that readers of *Insight* would need to apply these further modifications to their enactment of self-appropriation, although he did try to make altogether clear in the "Introduction" that "more than all else the aim of the book is to issue an invitation to a personal, decisive act."⁸ This almost goes without saying as far as the appropriation of rational *self*-consciousness in chapter 18 is concerned.⁹ The responsibility and commitment intrinsic to rational judgment in chapter 9 are one thing;¹⁰ "a volitional appropriation of the truth that consists in our willingness to live up to it, and a sensitive appropriation of the truth that consists in an adaptation of our sensibility to the requirements of our knowledge and our decisions,"¹¹ quite another. According to *Trino*, until such an appropriation of the truth about ourselves actually takes place, "the intellectual operations of the temporal subject have to be governed by the spontaneity proper to that intellectual light, which in us is a certain created participation in uncreated light" (DDT2, 299), which doesn't seem too bad, if you think about it.

In *Insight*, Lonergan uses the term 'autonomy' to characterize the closed circle of intelligible regularities verifiable from any higher viewpoint in knowledge or any higher integration of being. Our discussion of the distinction between spontaneous and autonomous human becoming should also take into account in Lonergan's use in *Trino* of the term 'autonomous' in the course of

his explanation of procession as intelligible emanation. Perhaps the elementary meaning of autonomy has to do with the distinction between two different kinds of processions in consciousness: (1) the *processio operationis* by which the possible intellect moves from potency to the act of understanding because it is informed by the intelligible species hitherto only immanent in the data, and the act of willing that arises in the will due to the reception of the habit in the will; (2) the *processio operati* by which the act of defining arises from the act of understanding, the act of judging arises from the act of grasping the sufficiency of the evidence, and the act of choosing arises from the practical judgment. In each of these types, the procession of an act from an act within consciousness defines what is meant by an intelligible emanation. All these kinds of intelligible emanation occur in virtue of the specifically spiritual and intelligent operation of consciousness. They are distinct from all instances of material causality, whose regularity or lawfulness is specific; whereas the spiritual lawfulness or regularity governing intelligible emanations is not specific but transcendental. The kind of lawfulness operative here is not fully determined by any nature, genus, or species, but is ordered to the transcendentals: “being (= the concrete, whole, existing), the one, the true, the good” (DDT2: 89). “For this reason, the intelligent part is the mistress of itself, determinative of itself, *autonomous*.” (DDT2: 89, emphasis added) The transcendental desire to know is *the* instance in the created universe of an entity that “gives itself the law.”

This, then, is the context for that striking use of the term in “*Existenz and Aggiornamento*,” which goes beyond what is specified above, and which has more to do with the temporal subject: “The self in the first period makes itself; but in a second period this making oneself is open-eyed, deliberate. Autonomy decides what autonomy is to be.”¹² The radical tendency or spontaneity of the mind and heart is a conscious and transcendental desire, which is expressed in practical (What is to be done? Is it to be done?), speculative (What? Is it so?), existential (What can or should I make of myself? Should I so make myself?) questions. In answering these questions we unfold the exigences immanent in inquiry, doubting, deliberating, lest we judge without understanding, adhere

to falsehoods that are only apparently true, or rush blindly into perdition (DDT2: 90). But once we formulate because of understanding, judge what is because of grasping the sufficiency of the evidence, decide or choose in harmony with our practical judgments, we thereby constitute within ourselves the proximate proportionate principle that bestows autonomy upon our intelligence, our reasonableness, and our freedom. So the intelligible emanations of formulation from activated intelligence, of judgments from activated reasonableness, and of choices from true practical judgments constitute our acts conscious and autonomous. However, acts of understanding proceed from inquiry not autonomously but spontaneously. Otherwise, our acts are spontaneous but unconscious,¹³ when we operate in accord with dispositions and habits modifying conjugates that are normally unconscious (i.e. having to do with non-reflective sensitivity or lower manifolds). Then the spontaneous causality in our living is more material than it is spiritual, more spontaneously aware than autonomous (DDT2: 91).

1.2 Social Mediation of the Autonomous Subject

In the context of “the times of the subject” Lonergan says that when temporal subjects learn about their intellectual nature they become able to understand the objective order of reality, to grasp their duties in that objective order, and to accept their subordinate role in that order. Hence, the more sensitive and intelligent subjects are, the more developed people’s imaginations, the more liberated from merely organic and psychic dominance, the more their intelligences can attain an understanding of the universe of being. Then their organic and psychic lives are integrated into life lived according to the subjects’ intelligent and reasonable discoveries and commands. This is a higher integration of merely instinctual animal living through the transformations by which persons enter the new field of tools and signs invented by intelligence (DDT2: 201) as people pass consciously from intersubjective community to civil community.¹⁴ If they are successful in making this shift, they can guide and direct their activities both wisely and effectively.

Trino's analysis of the times of the subject locates the temporal subject's transition in the context of personal relationships: "the condition of this very temporal subject is such that the transition from the prior to the later subject can hardly occur except under the influence of other temporal subjects" (DDT2: 201-2). The measure in which a temporal subject makes the transition depends on a manifestation of and honest acceptance of oneself. This word 'manifestation' is reminiscent of Paul Ricoeur's definition of revelation in terms of poetics.¹⁵ It suggests primordial exegesis or interpretation in human self-understanding. We can grasp Lonergan's sense of the term in the 1958 lectures published as *Understanding and Being*:

Self-appropriation is conditioned not merely by the fact that one is empirically, intelligently, and rationally conscious; it is conditioned also by that fact as manifested. The fact is manifested, first of all in those activities and products that are sensible things that can be interpreted, as it were. They are material creations such as the material creations of modern science. You can go right back to the earliest forms of technology, man using instruments. There is a manifestation of intelligence and reasonableness in the things that man makes, in the way that men behave. That is a first level of manifestation.

Insofar as the activities and products are linguistic, one has again a fuller and more immediate manifestation.¹⁶

Lonergan then speaks of science as providing "a fuller object upon which one can reflect to attain one's self-appropriation; and then on a level of a succession of philosophies, ... one meets the objective manifestation and expression of the polymorphism of the human subject."

The multiplicity of compact and differentiated historical, cultural, and individual self-interpretations yield manifestations that are either concrete and symbolic or technical and exact, and that presuppose the long-term collaboration of many people.¹⁷ They are concrete and symbolic in the determinate manners, mores, customs, precepts, and stories that are told at any stage of a given cultural development. Lonergan insists that individual temporal

subjects need other people's manifestations of the meaning and value of human nature—whether as scientific or philosophic inquiries into human nature—if they are to voluntarily accept the specifically intellectual norms and exigences as normative for the integration of their human living.

Even if human nature were not fallen, however, this higher integration would not occur automatically. In the spontaneous stage, people have to be liberated in artistic, dramatic, and practical fields of activity from the animal laws of biological extroversion, to arrive at regularities understood, judged, and chosen by human intelligence, reason, and responsibility. Through love and belief people will assimilate and learn from the influence of others whatever these others in turn have embraced through love and belief. On the level of comfortable self-preservation and utility, the criterion of the success of such learning is easier because can it be readily applied to the consequences of people's choices. Lonergan notes that the higher aspirations framed by the nature and end of humanity do not admit of such methodical and empirical ways of self-correction, and so there is the division of labor that brings forth priests, poets, and philosophers to speculate about these things. But because the mediation of love and belief is ambiguously good or evil, the mythic consciousness of the spontaneous subject, even as gradually supplemented by better scientific and philosophical clarifications of human nature, is hardly up to the task of decreasing the abundant occasions for the human penchant for confusion and darkness. As he tells us in *Insight*, "There exist infantile and demonic aspects of mythic consciousness."¹⁸

Having sketched the dimension of historical and cultural mediations of the meaning of being human, Lonergan clarifies three distinct ways in which the transition from the spontaneous to the autonomous subject might occur: 1) through the enactment of personal understanding, or 2) through the mediation of the true words of others, or 3) because of virtuous love and friendship. Let us briefly clarify these three abstract possibilities. First, either in compact, symbolic representations or in differentiated technical expressions, people may understand, affirm, and approve their intellectual nature and its intrinsic norms, go on to embrace them by

personal acts of will, and expressly intend to follow these norms. Second, even though people do not understand their intellectual natures themselves, they may listen to and believe the words of those who do; by their own will and intention, they can choose to live in accord with that belief, only gradually coming to understand, judge, and approve those norms and exigences for themselves later on. Finally, some persons may be united to one another in love, from which belief would follow; and by ‘believing to understand,’ they may finally understand their intellectual nature and its intrinsic norms. Here Lonergan nuances the hermeneutics of facticity in a way that is more in accord with Gadamer than with Heidegger.

Moving from the abstract to the concrete, the third possibility is the most probably relevant one, in spite of the concrete context of moral impotence and bad will due to the reign of sin. Lonergan makes clear that the probability of sin means that people are not likely to grasp the norms of their intellectual natures clearly, or they will not consent to be converted to the later time of the autonomous subject in case they do. As he put it in *Trino*, when they could believe the true teachings of good teachers, they prefer to listen to what is easier; they could have virtuous friends, but they stick with companions who are “more suave and sweet” (DDT2: 202). They neither know what ought to be nor perform what they know. Evil pervades and the absurd human situation is used as evidence that it is absurd to follow intelligence and reasonableness. Lonergan concludes that because of this ambivalence of belief and friendship we can only have recourse to the eternal subjects.

Now any reader of this section of *Trino* will recognize that the issue of submitting to the norms and exigencies of our intellectual nature is a partial restatement of *Insight’s* articulation of human development in chapter 15.¹⁹ To cite *in extenso* a familiar passage:

Intellectual development rests upon the dominance of a detached and disinterested desire to know. It reveals to man a universe of being, in which he is but an item, and a universal order, in which his desires and fears, his delight and anguish, are but infinitesimal components in the history of mankind. It invites man to become intelligent and reasonable not only in his knowing but also in his living, to guide his actions by referring them, not as an animal to

a habitat, but as an intelligent being to the intelligible context of some universal order that is or is to be. Still, it is difficult for man, even in knowing to be dominated simply by the pure desire, and it is far more difficult for him to permit that detachment and disinterestedness to dominate his whole way of life. For the self, as perceiving and feeling, as enjoying and suffering, functions as an animal in an environment, as a self-attached and self-interested centre within its own narrow world of stimuli and responses. But the same self, as inquiring and reflecting, as conceiving intelligently and judging reasonably, is carried by his own higher spontaneity to quite a different mode of operation with the opposite attributes of detachment and disinterestedness. It is confronted with a universe of being in which it finds itself, not the centre of reference, but an object coordinated with other objects and, with them, subordinated to some destiny to be discovered or invented, approved or disdained, accepted or repudiated.²⁰

Moreover, *Trino* on the passage from the spontaneous to the autonomous temporal subject also reformulates of the “law of genuineness” in *Insight*,²¹ and of the fact that “if a development is conscious, then its success demands correct apprehension of its starting point, its process, and its goal.” Lonergan contrasts the emergence into consciousness of “an obviously practicable and proximate ideal self” with the tensions that arise from the “unwelcome invasion of consciousness by opposed apprehensions of oneself as one concretely is and as one concretely is to be. ... Genuineness is the admission of that tension into consciousness, and so it is the necessary condition of the harmonious cooperation of the conscious and the unconscious components of development.”²² After a vigorous description of how the genuine person would overcome the inconsistencies between what they actually are and what they are aware they should be, Lonergan admits that “such genuineness is ideal,” and that “it goes far beyond the native endowment of detachment and disinterestedness that we possess in the pure desire to know.”²³

This is a shame, because the sanction incurred by such a failure of genuineness is devastating: the displacement of the tension between limitation and transcendence, which “is at the root of the

dialectical phenomena of scotosis in the individual, of the bias of common sense, of basic philosophical differences, and of their prolongation in natural and human science, in morals and religion, in educational theory and history.”²⁴ This is where genetic method must yield to dialectical method in the study of human beings.

Now Patrick H. Byrne has clarified for us that what evolve are populations. Lonergan’s lectures on economic theory at Boston College demonstrate that he would later use the term ‘ecology,’ making the term population somewhat more determinate.²⁵ The point is that, in accord with emergent probability, different combinations of verified correlations operating within ranges of schemes of recurrence render the occurrence of any given set of conjugate acts systematic in things or persons actual.²⁶ As far as we are concerned with the transition from the spontaneous to the autonomous subject, for example, the probability of emergence and survival of genuine individuals who habitually confront and work on the tension between limitation and transcendence in their lives actually depends on the intersubjective and civil communities in which they live. So the limitations imposed by the lack of coordination within the single individual between the organic and psychic levels and the intellectual level on the operators that develop the relevant higher integrations is mirrored in society’s dialectical conflicts between the intersubjective and the civil communities. As Lonergan says, “the dialectic of community holds the dominant position, for it gives rise to the situations that stimulate neural demands and it moulds the orientation of intelligence that preconsciously exercises the censorship” that filters the feelings and images that enter our stream of consciousness.²⁷

Later on in chapter 17, *Insight* moves from the metaphysics proportionate to the range of emergent probability (focused on less than human levels of being) to treat the categories of scientific interpretation necessary for the study of the human level. Here the interest is in construing documents and objectified expressions such as monuments and artworks as sensible signs that exhibit a spatial order.²⁸ This focus only globally envisages the primordial exegesis of experience involved in attaining self-knowledge suggested by the third chapter of *Method*’s discussion of the dimensions of

meaning or in the chapter on functional specialty Interpretation.²⁹ Nevertheless, in *Insight* Lonergan makes a significant shift from speaking of the notion of being to articulating an explanatory account of the protean notion of being in order to acknowledge the relevance of the range of ambiguity that polymorphic human consciousness may introduce into both self-interpretation and the interpretation of the signs and symbols of others. Indeed, chapter 17 of *Insight* pursues this broader and richer horizon with spellbinding amplitude. This radically new departure is especially evidenced by the discussion of the “remote criterion of the truth,” which has to do with the historicity of polymorphic consciousness.³⁰ That human beings live by ongoing interpretation of the situations in which they have to live is also explored in *Insight*’s earlier discussions of the patterns of experience and the biases,³¹ in the discussion of “The Appropriation of the Truth,”³² of symbols and signs, of myths and mysteries.³³ At issue is the dialectical unity-in-tension between the higher integration performed by human understanding, judgment, decision, and belief and the integrated level of human beings as specified in terms of the sensitive level,³⁴ which is a restatement of the distinction between merely spontaneous and autonomous times of the subject in *Trino* discussed above.

Frederick Crowe tells us that the writing of *Insight* was all but finished in 1953. In 1956 *De constitutione Christi psychologica et ontologica* was published to make certain relevant foundational findings available in the Latin then in use at the Gregorian University even before the 1957 edition of *Insight*.³⁵ Lonergan put the issue of the times of the subject by enlisting the language of *Existenz* that he rendered *ex-sistere*, as in the following passage:

Although physical, chemical, biological, and psychic laws are operative in us, the higher synthesis itself is not actual but potential. For we are not made in such a way that by some natural necessity our reason *must* rule over our lower nature, but that it *ought* to do so. Such dominion must be achieved through the exercise of one’s reason and personal freedom in order for one to become a true, proper, authentic and genuine human being. It is up to each one, therefore, out of the potentiality each one has, to achieve his or her own *Existenz*.³⁶

Just as the passage from spontaneous to autonomous human living in *Trino*, or from unconscious to conscious intelligent control in *Insight* are **at stake**, so too is the achievement of *Existenz* (with explicit reference to Kierkegaard) in *De constitutione*. In this context “wisdom, understanding, and knowledge” and “wills endowed with virtues” are the conditions that need to be fulfilled “so that one may at last learn what one ought to be and will to make oneself what one ought to be.”³⁷ What to me is of overwhelming significance, however, is the pointed manner in which the Kierkegaardian reference-frame compels Lonergan to speak of the transition in terms of *conversion*.³⁸ In “Cognitional Structure” (1964) Lonergan will speak of *Insight*’s self-appropriation of the knower as “an intellectual conversion *ex umbris et imaginibus in veritatem*.”³⁹ How striking, then, that in 1956 Lonergan communicates the issue of what is tantamount to the appropriation of rational self-consciousness by combining the languages of existentialism and mysticism:

It can surely come as no surprise that very few indeed ‘exist,’ that very few have learned that ‘the real’ or the ‘really real’ is what becomes known under the name of being through the mediation of concepts and judgments, that very few have come through a kind of dark night of the senses so purified as to surrender themselves wholeheartedly, effectively, and perseveringly to the intelligible and true good.⁴⁰

Appropriating Kierkegaard, Lonergan says that transcending the “aesthetic sphere of existential subjectivity” in which one “is immersed in the world of the senses” requires being “converted to the intelligible world,” where “things will be seen to be real insofar as they *are* (that is, insofar as they can be known by being understood and affirmed).”⁴¹

2. Hermeneutics of Facticity and Ethics

In *Trino* Lonergan invokes need for personal relationships in virtuous friendships; but *Insight* first indicates that “the basic problem” of integration is “to discover the dynamic images that

both correspond to intellectual contents, orientations, and determinations yet also possess in the sensible field the power to issue forth not only into words but also into deeds.... The intelligent and reasonable control of human living can be effective only in the measure that it has at its disposal the symbols and signs by which it translates its directives to human sensitivity.” This is a quite practical issue for Lonergan: “For unless one can carry out in deeds what one knows and wills, then the willing already is a failure and from failing will to unconcern for truth there are the easy and, unfortunately, familiar steps.”⁴²

All these dimensions of human becoming in time are significant but not altogether explicit in the basic account of the relationship between knowing and doing sketched in chapter 18 on “The Possibility of Ethics.”⁴³ The chapter cannot be summarized here, but I shall simply state some salient issues.

Once the pure and unrestricted desire successfully unfolds in the judgment that follows from the grasp of the sufficiency of evidence, a person knows what is or what is not, what does or does not account for the data in question. Then the person knows the truth. Among the totality of true affirmations are those that assert not simply what is, but a good that should be done. In these cases the truth is a value, and the true judgment is a judgment of value. Then one’s knowing is oriented to doing. At this juncture, we recognize that it is one thing to know what should be done, and quite another to will or do it. Nothing can be willed unless it is first known, but once it is known there arises an exigence for doing to be consistent with knowing, and that requires an act of will, decision, choice, since knowing alone never determines action.⁴⁴

Willing, then, depends on knowing, because it is grounded in knowing. We are free to will anything that is known to be of value.⁴⁵ Both *Insight* and *Topics in Education* stress that all objects of willing fall within the range of the pure and unrestricted desire to know.⁴⁶ Again, in accord with the conditions of freedom specified by Thomas Aquinas and retrieved by Lonergan in *Grace and Freedom*, the unrestricted desire to know can only be fulfilled insofar as one knows God as God is, immediately. In that unique case, the human will would not be free but determined to its object. But we

are wayfarers in this terrestrial life, and as such we never know God as God is, for that only occurs in the vision of the blessed. Still, human beings have questions; any true conceptions and affirmations they attain of God are mediated and analogous; and no matter how many answers they may attain, there are (and here below there always will be) more unanswered questions.⁴⁷ It follows that in this life the human will cannot be determined by any object of knowledge. Indeed, if human freedom is the most sublime instance of created contingency, it is so because ultimately it is grounded not just in the unrestricted desire to know but in the desire to know God.

More proximately, the exercise of human freedom is grounded in the I who acts freely: “Why this act? Because of *me*.”⁴⁸ Since liberty is an issue of rational *self*-consciousness it pertains to the context of the hermeneutics of facticity outlined above. Here we need to pay attention not just to what is consciously operative in us as the “detached and disinterested desire raising ever further questions;” we must also intelligently and reasonably confront what is unconsciously operative as the “finality that consists in the upwardly but indeterminately directed dynamism of all proportionate being.” This calls for the heightened awareness that would allow questions to arise about “one’s own unconscious initiatives, their subsumption under the general order intelligence discovers in the universe of being, their integration in the fabric of one’s habitual living.”⁴⁹ The goal of radical self-interpretation is for the conscious and unconscious components of the development to operate “from the same base along the same route to the same goal.”⁵⁰ Lonergan’s hermeneutics of facticity is the ongoing personal discovery of the starting point, the term, and the process of integral or authentic self-development.

2.1 The Role of the Human Good in the Becoming of the Autonomous Subject

The interrelation of ethics with genuineness or authenticity demands a more complicated account of practical knowledge, deliberation, decision, choice, and action in relation to the human good. Throughout *Insight* Lonergan constantly interweaves

subjective and objective issues. Thus, Chapters 6 & 7 roughly correspond to what in *Topics* are named (reversing the order) “The Human Good as Developing Subject” and “The Human Good as Developing Object.” In chapter 18, Lonergan correlates the empirical level of desire, the intelligent level of practical insight, and the rational level of practical reflection/judgment with levels in the structure of the human good: particular goods, goods of order, and terminal values.⁵¹ Hence, answering the question for deliberation about what to do by understanding and formulating possible courses of action requires one to understand the intelligibility of a desired object or of the possible transformation either of one’s environment or of one’s own spontaneous living. For Lonergan this means moving beyond the apprehension of objects of our appetites *tout court* to considering them both in the context of intelligible goods of order “linked with one another in mutual dependence, or as conditioned and condition, or as part and whole,”⁵² and in the context of the reasons for our choices. The further question for deliberation, i.e., whether the understood course of action should be done, requires reflection in light of goals (goods of order, values) on the answer already attained by practical insight about what to do. Concretely, this reflection is a matter of reaching a practical judgment about a possible object of rational choice by discerning what is practically intelligent and reasonable as opposed to what is suggested by counter-positions or by polymorphic desires and fears other than the desire to know. This we do in light not only of civic community but, what is explicit in chapter 7 and left implicit in chapter 18, cultural community. This is constituted by “publicly expressed reflection, appreciation, criticism” of one’s community.⁵³

Insight explains what is ultimately at stake in practical judgment: human intelligence is to provide the higher system for sensitive living not merely unconsciously but consciously. “It does so unconsciously inasmuch as it grounds the pattern in which sensitive experience occurs...”⁵⁴ However, the conscious intellectual control of one’s sensitive living is enormously different: when Lonergan says that “Conscious intelligence is engaged primarily in grasping the intelligible systems relevant, not to one’s sensitive living, but to the contents of one’s sensitive experience,” he is also stating that in

its normative functioning the supervening conscious intelligence adds detachment and objectivity to mere sensing. He goes on to say:

By this shift from subjective acts to objective contents, [conscious intelligence] is headed towards the systematization, not of the particular animal that I am, but of the whole universe of being. And it is within its knowledge of the universe that knowledge of itself is attained, knowledge of its function in the universe is acquired, and the grounds for willing the execution of that function provided. Finally, it is through willing that conscious intellectual control of sensitive living is effected.⁵⁵

Mediating our grasp of the order of the universe therefore is what Voegelin called “a cosmion illuminated from within by its own self-interpretation,” “a little world of meaning.”⁵⁶ In the 1950s and early 1960s Lonergan tended to analyze this cosmion in terms of the good of order that *Trino* says is comprised by “(1) many persons, (2) apprehensive and appetitive habits, (3) multitudinous operations ordered among themselves on the part of many people, (4) a succession and series of manifold particular goods, (5) interpersonal relations” (DDT2: 245). Note that this formulation sublates particular goods into the good of order and folds into the second level of the human good the interpersonal relations that appear on the third, distinct level of terminal values in other accounts. As is clear from the essay, “The Role of the Catholic University in the Modern World,” we know that the good of order as a component in the human good corresponds to civil community, which sublates the intersubjective community and its particular goods, while cultural community in all its possible ambiguity in turn sublates civil community.⁵⁷ In Voegelin’s cosmion, civil and cultural community are solidarity.

Thus, when Lonergan correlates practical insight with understanding the intelligibility of a possible course of action in terms of the good of order, and practical reflection with terminal values, he also implies that whenever we do this, as knowing subjects we have to imagine, understand, and judge products of social interaction whose meaning is determined by the institutional networks—families, technology, economy, polity—and the cultural mediations that make

up one's "lifeworld." When knowing subjects ask about possible courses of action, they talk to themselves and others in languages that were themselves coined not merely in social (family, technology, economy) but also in political and cultural interactions. Lonergan tends only to address the political dimension explicitly in his social critiques of bureaucracy. Nonetheless, when the questions for deliberation arise, they occur to spontaneously or autonomously existing human beings in a socio-political location about a course of action that will affect both themselves and others. The key here is that they do so fatefully either under the sway of "desires and fears" or governed by "the pure and detached desire to know."

2.2 The Hermeneutics of Moral Impotence

Chapter 18 on the possibility of ethics is also about the impossibility of ethics, in the sense that the "moving viewpoint" could not omit a phenomenology of the gap between natural liberty and effective freedom caused by individual and collective moral impotence from a discussion of human freedom as grounded proximately in a human decision that for good or ill cannot be determined on the level of cognition alone.⁵⁸ I will not dwell on moral impotence, except to remark on its significance for Lonergan's overall hermeneutics of authenticity in *Insight*.

People not particularly sympathetic to the argument of *Insight* have noticed its ulterior thrust towards Christian apologetics. By chapter 19's elaboration of General Transcendence,⁵⁹ the momentum of the book works almost like "ratchet action," as one acquaintance put it. Driven to conceive and affirm divine transcendence, it is almost as if one could only refuse to raise chapter 20's question about a divine solution to the human problem of universal moral impotence at the cost of obscurantism, the arbitrary brushing aside of questions.⁶⁰ Besides his conscious intentions about constructing a philosophy as a basis for method in theology, Lonergan was also writing his own version of Newman's *A Grammar of Assent*. Of course, those I know who saw what was coming and did not like what they saw, "put the book down" (in every sense of the phrase) instead of "going all the way." How difficult it must

have been for Lonergan to keep prescinding from the existential fact that as the author of *Insight* he *was* a Catholic, a priest, a Jesuit, and a dogmatic theologian, by never spiriting unwarranted presuppositions ahead of time into the “moving viewpoint”! Yet he did do his best to maintain the stance of “understanding in order to believe” (*intellige ut credas*) in order to show a ‘sufficiently cultured’ post-Nietzschean reader that the turn to a stance of “believing to understand” (*crede ut intelligas*) could be made with complete intellectual probity (*intellektuelle Redlichkeit*, for Nietzsche the last of the virtues), and with no taint of primitive superstition or romantic escapism.

Those familiar with his theology of the redemption know Lonergan’s devotion to Augustine’s insight that God chose to create a universe in which redemption involves the miracle of overcoming evil with good, or even bringing good out of evil.⁶¹ Clearly, this motif plays into the unfolding of *Insight*. The Epilogue’s insistence that the more existential philosophy becomes, the more the dividing line between philosophy and theology will fade away,⁶² is borne out in his supposition that a non-obscurantist confrontation of the implications of moral impotence will lead one to raise the further question about a solution to the problem of evil; that such a one could use all that had been said earlier in the book about emergent probability, about classical, statistical, genetic and dialectical methods and the dynamics of human historical development to erect an elaborate heuristic structure of such a solution, and do so from a viewpoint that owes nothing to divine revelation.⁶³ In *Insight* everything is geared to demonstrating the adequacy of human intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility (so long as it avoids counter-positions) for figuring out the spot humanity is in, without the aid of strictly revealed truth.

2.3 Modern Counter-positions on the Solution to the Problem of Moral Impotence

Kant’s definition of the Enlightenment as the human race’s attainment of adulthood, in which it becomes responsible for itself instead of obeying external authorities,⁶⁴ is not unrelated to

Loneragan's shift from the spontaneous to the autonomous subject, even if the reality of moral impotence has rendered Kant's announcement of the historical emergence of the entirely rational and autonomous enlightened subject rather premature.

Kant's philosophy grounds freedom, human dignity, and ultimately human rights in the natural human capacity to act in accord with the categorical imperative, the social formulation of which is the 'kingdom of ends': we may not use persons as means to ends they do not choose themselves.⁶⁵ Kant's notion of dignity is based on human autonomy—the capacity to give oneself the law. For Kant the very exercise of the human capacity to “give the law to oneself,” leaves behind the body,⁶⁶ overlooking the law of limitation and transcendence and the contingent and analogous law of human development, not to mention the fact of moral impotence. Indeed, Hans Jonas has shown that when we combine Kant's account of the will's autonomy with his teaching on basic evil in *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft*, human freedom becomes dialectically equiprimordial with moral renunciation and insufficiency.⁶⁷ This may be why the effective history of human dignity has married Kant's idea with the notion of human rights, thus endowing a meaning antithetical to Kant's (because it is derived from the selfish feeling regarding preservation) with the aura of Kant's lofty meaning. As Pierre Manent states the matter, “To respect the dignity of another human being is no longer to respect the respect that that person preserves in himself for the moral law; today it is increasingly to respect whatever choice he makes in order to achieve his rights.”⁶⁸

In the wake of Nietzsche, who pioneered the deconstruction of the Enlightenment project of emancipation in order to find a way out of the disillusionment caused by its historical failure, Kant's ideas of morality and dignity have undergone other changes in the same direction. For example, in his reflections on Marcel Duchamp's breakthrough from modernism (with his *readymades* and his re-definition of genius as the impossibility of making), the student of Michel Foucault, Thierry de Duve, draws the inference that Kant's categorical imperative must itself be universalized into “Do whatever!” This means that we have to envision courses of action

or works of art in terms of Kant's criterion for judgments of taste: "purposiveness without a purpose," which Duve paraphrases as "a goal with no historical ending, no prescribed term, and no other purpose but respecting the maxim, with no criterion justifying the means."⁶⁹

For Duve the generalization of Kant's imperative into *Do whatever!* means that individuals or governments will have to operate in accord with an Idea of humanity *as if* human beings were all rational and reasonable. The idea of humanity operates as a regulative idea. However, as Manent has shown, the effective history of Kant's idea of humanity has united Kantian universalism with equality by means of the key insight that we are all similar to each other.⁷⁰ Still, humanity (in the modern sense: detached from nature) always remains a general and vague idea, equally relevant yet equally indifferent to every concrete situation. Rather than directly generating moral precepts grounded in concrete reality, this regulative idea has given rise to two lines of interpretation: 1) Kantian respect for the person's spiritual being or dignity, and 2) Rousseau's sense of pity or compassion for the person's suffering body. If we reinterpret what Manent is suggesting from Lonergan's perspective, Kantian respect would be realized on the level of the civil community and its protection of rights, and would require both the mediation of intelligence and moral conversion, while Rousseau's compassion would be realized on the level of the immediate intuitions, imagination, and feelings of intersubjective community, with no need for moral transformation. As a matter of fact, in a more postmodern culture most people take the easier way out on this issue.

We may suspect, however, that Hegel in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* has settled the issue of respect, especially when, "for contemporary moralism, respect for human dignity is respect of 'life-contents,' whatever they may be, of the other human being."⁷¹ Contemporary moralism demands that we "approve, appreciate, value, applaud" all life-choices or life-styles. Think of the feelings unleashed by issues such as abortion/choice or gay/heterosexual marriage. But what respect comes down to concretely Hegel unmasked in the dialectic of the life and death struggle for recognition.⁷² His profound insight is that the ultimate object of

respect is death, the absolute master. To approve, appreciate, value, and applaud any political, moral, and religious choices would deprive all of them of weight or significance: “the unbearable lightness of being.”

Lonergan’s premodern criterion of self-transcendence has something in common with Hegel insofar as it finally comes down to what you live by, but also what you would be willing to die for.⁷³ However, from Hegel’s profound though thoroughly modern viewpoint, death as absolute master means that concretely ‘respect,’ even Kantian respect, is connected with intimidation, since anyone living in terms of ambition (and so desires and fears) only respects someone who can help or harm them in the “race for wealth and honors” (Adam Smith) or the *Kampf ums Existenz* (German for social Darwinism). Pierre Manent correctly says that, even under the best of conditions, respect means “respectful fear of another’s liberty.”⁷⁴ No wonder then, that when Kant shifts from the realm of abstract morality into the concrete political realm in his writings on the philosophy of history, there results from the conflicts arising from “the unsocial sociability of man”⁷⁵ a “maxim of mutual co-existence”⁷⁶ that can be observed by “a civil society populated by devils”⁷⁷—an outcome that is virtually undistinguishable from Hobbes’s conception of civil society as based on fear of violent death.

Within the longer cycle of decline, then, Western civilization has chosen the dialectical alternative to Lonergan’s downright and honest approach to the supernatural solution to the problem of evil. It has transformed our cultural heritage by adapting the human spirit to the dominant darkness of the objective surd. In an odd sense, the modern option integrates Lonergan’s idea that if the human being is to “be only a man” in the context of the problem of evil “it must be less”⁷⁸ into its solution to the problem of living, because in a variety of ways, modern philosophies either ‘naturalize’ sin—the ‘state of nature’ theories of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau—or conflate the objective surd with human finitude—Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger.

As a matter of empirical fact, most people live within a horizon dominated by what *Insight* regularly calls “desires and fears.” In a footnote on Harry Stack Sullivan⁷⁹ and in the

“Existentialism Lectures,” Lonergan quotes him to the effect that human development regularly occurs along lines of least anxiety. In terms of the specifically modern horizon, human beings are not social by nature, but possessive or expressive individualists, whose basic project is self-assertion or resoluteness in the face of death. From this perspective intelligence and rationality are demoted to simple instruments for disoriented wills. Consequently, the goods of order are construed to be no more than instruments for the satisfaction of appetitive desires and fears. Coherently with this perspective the cultural channels of the arts, education, and entertainment promote what Voegelin calls ‘deculturation’: immediate satisfaction for the masses or superficial “success” for the ‘A-type’ personalities and fast-track self-starters.⁸⁰ In a zero-sum society, it’s winner take all. The losers and the defenseless—the old, the handicapped, the young in poverty and hunger, the fetuses, and the embryos may be sacrificed for sake of the market or the winners: *Vai victis*—Woe to the victims!

The most highly regarded political regime of modernity is liberal democracy. Thomas Hobbes and his follower John Locke articulated its foundational philosophical anthropology. For Hobbes, we recall, fear is the root of action, and so for him the law of nature in society is erected on the flight from death. Kant’s attempt to separate the morality of the good will from lowly pathological emotions, inclinations, and drives is often thought to provide the great alternative to Hobbesian anthropology. As we mentioned Hegel has shown us, it does not.

In the context of ‘deculturation,’ Heidegger, in his early interpretations of Aristotle, conflates with an inevitable human inclination towards self-destructiveness the ease with which Aristotle says most people miss the mean of excellence by either excess or defect.⁸¹ This correlates with a set of social and cultural recurrence schemes that Paul in *Romans* calls “the reign of sin,” and which Lonergan translates as an expectation or probability of sin.⁸² But in light of Heidegger’s “methodological atheism,”⁸³ the relationship with God that makes an irrational and irresponsible act a sin is secularized and trivialized into an outcome of human fallenness interpreted as an existential of human finitude. Before *Sein und*

Zeit Heidegger thematized human facticity's innate proclivity—sometimes exultant, sometimes not—towards sin in terms of *Ruinanz*; in *Sein und Zeit* he analyzed fearing and anxiety as modes of the existential fundamental phenomenon of state-of-mind [*Befindlichkeit*]. He thus generalized Hobbes's analysis of fear that was argumentatively linked to a deduction of natural law. In this way he cemented human self-presence-as-presence-to-world into a horizon determined by death. In the age of modernity the image or idea of biological death marks the limit of *Dasein*'s caring. The breakthrough to authenticity that occurs when one resolutely comes to terms with death confronts a nothingness that really is only nothing. This reflects a closure of horizon that renounces questions regarding the order of the universe or about a transcendence that goes beyond the universe.

The horizon defined by death reflects the self as alienated from God, from itself, from other human beings, and from all the rest of the universe: “evil is revealed to be not merely a human wrong but also sin, revolt against God, and abuse of his goodness and love, a pragmatic calumny that hides from oneself and from others the absolute goodness and perfect love that through the universe and through men expresses itself to men.”⁸⁴ This alienation lies at the root of modern alibis, cover stories, and ideologies (i.e., counter-positions on goods of order), whether formulated in Hobbesian, Kantian, Hegelian, Marxist, or Heideggerian terms. On the position, the political good of order is “peaceful activity in accord with the dignity of man,”⁸⁵ rather than organized collective selfishness or an institutional protection of the manipulation, suppression, and exploitation of each by all (“laws with teeth in them”). On the position, says Lonergan, this political order can only be realized if the individual choosers are habitually willing to align particular goods and concrete goods of order with the good of the universe; and they are more likely to do this if they believe that the goods of order within which they live participate in a transcendent order, a transcendent good. For as Lonergan loved to quote Aquinas, “the purpose of the universe is a good existing in it, namely, the order of the universe itself”⁸⁶; and “the universe as a whole is a more perfect participation in and reflection of the divine goodness

than any individual creature.”⁸⁷

2.4 *Redemption as the Positional Solution of the Problem of Evil*

Heidegger’s student, Karl Rahner’s philosophical works have remarkable similarities to Lonergan’s thought. In my first conversation with Lonergan, he told me that they had each hit independently upon *Summa theologiae* I, q. 84, art. 7 on the human need for a conversion to phantasms in order to understand as the starting point for *Geist in Welt* and for *Verbum/Insight*, respectively. In another conversation in Rome, Lonergan called Rahner’s philosophy of religion, *Hörer des Wortes*, a work of genius.⁸⁸ In that work, the exigence for human beings to listen for a possible personal address from God arises from the structure of human transcendence-in-immanence, which is roughly equivalent to Aquinas’s natural desire to see God.⁸⁹ For Lonergan in *Insight*, however, confronting the mounting, humanly intractable evil in the world is to motivate thoughtful readers in their self-interpretation to ask the question of redemption.⁹⁰ In *Insight* redemption functions as a higher complex, dialectical intelligibility that takes the surd into account. This comes out in *De Verbo Incarnato*’s formulation of the historical intelligibility of redemption in terms of the “Law of the Cross.”⁹¹ It is a solution that requires human apprehension and consent to “a mystery that is at once symbol of the uncomprehended and sign of what is grasped and psychic force that sweeps living human bodies, linked in charity, to the joyful, courageous, whole-hearted, yet intelligently controlled performance of the tasks set by a world order in which the problem of evil is not suppressed but transcended.”⁹² This solution includes “the sensible data that are demanded by man’s sensitive nature and that will command his attention, nourish his imagination, stimulate his affectivity, control his aggressivity and, as central features of the world of sense, intimate its finality, its yearning for God.”⁹³

That law is expressed symbolically in St Paul’s contrast in *Romans* 5 between a solidarity in Adam moving through sin to death and a solidarity in Christ Jesus moving through death to life. It appeals

not to the regulative idea of humanity but to supernatural acts of charity, hope, and faith mediated into history by sending of the Son in the life and death of the Word Incarnate, and the pouring out into our hearts of the Holy Spirit that has been given to us. But this is where *Insight's* expanding challenge to authenticity opens out beyond the scope of that "little book."

Notes

¹ See Martin Heidegger, "Augustinus und der Neuplatonismus, Wintersemester 1921," *Gesamtausgabe II. Abteilung: Vorlesungen*, vol. 60, *Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens*, ed. Claudia Strube (Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann 1995) 157-299.

² Augustine, *The Confessions*, trans. Maria Boulding, OSB, ed. John Rotelle, OSA (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1997) 30, 41-39, 64, 204-218.

³ See Martin Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2001).

⁴ See Martin Heidegger, *Ontology—The Hermeneutics of Facticity*, trans. John van Buren (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1999).

⁵ See Bernard Lonergan, "QUAESTIO XXI: QUAENAM SIT ANALOGIA SUBIECTI TEMPORALIS ET SUBIECTI AETERNI," *De Deo Trino II. Pars systematica, seu Divinarum personarum conceptio analogica* (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1964 [3rd, revised ed.] 196-204 (henceforth cited in the text as DDT2 with page number).

⁶ See Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* 3, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992) 343-371.

⁷ Lonergan, *Insight* 581-587.

⁸ Lonergan, *Insight* 13.

⁹ Lonergan, *Insight* 618-656.

¹⁰ Lonergan, *Insight* 297.

¹¹ Lonergan, *Insight* 581-582.

¹² See Bernard Lonergan, *Collection*, *CWL* 4, eds. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988) 223-224.

¹³ It seems to me that this regular use of 'unconscious' in *DDT2* and *Insight* is non-technical and does not literally mean without consciousness,

but refers to only a minimally heightened or reflective awareness.

¹⁴ Lonergan, *Insight* 237-8.

¹⁵ See Paul Ricoeur, "Toward a Hermeneutics of the Idea of Revelation," and "The Hermeneutics of Testimony," in *Essays on Biblical Interpretation*, ed. with an Introduction by L.S. Mudge (London, 1980) 73-118, 119-154.

¹⁶ See Bernard Lonergan, *Understanding and Being: The Halifax Lectures on INSIGHT*, CWL 5 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990) 219-220.

¹⁷ Lonergan, "The Genesis of Adequate Self-knowledge," *Insight* 558-560.

¹⁸ Lonergan, *Insight* 556, footnote 3.

¹⁹ Lonergan, *Insight* 492-511.

²⁰ Lonergan, *Insight* 498.

²¹ Lonergan, *Insight* 499-504 at 500.

²² Lonergan, *Insight* 502.

²³ Lonergan, *Insight* 502.

²⁴ Lonergan, *Insight* 503.

²⁵ See Bernard Lonergan, *Macroeconomic Dynamics: An Essay in Circulation Analysis*, CWL 15, eds. Patrick H. Byrne, Charles C. Hefling and Frederick G. Lawrence (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999) 3, 89, 93.

²⁶ Lonergan, *Insight* 463.

²⁷ Lonergan, *Insight* 243.

²⁸ Lonergan, "The Truth of Interpretation," *Insight* 585-616.

²⁹ See Bernard Lonergan, "Meaning" and "Interpretation," *Method in Theology* (New York: Herder & Herder, 1972) 57-99, 153-173.

³⁰ Lonergan, *Insight* 573-574.

³¹ Lonergan, *Insight* 204-231.

³² Lonergan, *Insight* 581-585.

³³ Lonergan, *Insight* 554-572.

³⁴ Lonergan, *Insight* 538-543.

³⁵ See Bernard Lonergan, *The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ*, CWL 7, ed. Frederick E. Crowe, trans. Michael Shields (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002).

³⁶ Lonergan, *Constitution of Christ* 21.

³⁷ Lonergan, *Constitution of Christ* 21.

³⁸ Lonergan, *Constitution of Christ* 23.

³⁹ Lonergan, *Collection* 205-221 at 219.

⁴⁰ Lonergan, *Constitution of Christ*, 23.

⁴¹ Lonergan, *Constitution of Christ* 23.

⁴² Lonergan, *Insight* 585.

⁴³ Lonergan, *Insight* 618-656.

⁴⁴ Lonergan, *Insight* 621-624; 626-631; 633-639.

⁴⁵ Lonergan, *Insight* 639-642.

⁴⁶ Lonergan, *Topics in Education: The Cincinnati Lectures of 1959 on the Philosophy of Education*, **CWL 10**, eds. Robert M. Doran and Frederick E. Crowe (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), starts from the scholastic tag, *ens et bonum convertuntur* in Chapter 2 (26-48), and correlates this with the *potens omnia facere et fieri* at the beginning of Chapter 3 (49-78).

⁴⁷ Lonergan, *Topics in Education* 30-32.

⁴⁸ Lonergan, *Understanding and Being* 230-231.

⁴⁹ Lonergan, *Insight* 501.

⁵⁰ Lonergan, *Insight* 500.

⁵¹ Lonergan, *Insight* 619-621; 624-626; 628-631.

⁵² Lonergan, *Insight* 626; compare the formulation at 619-620: the good of order “is not the object of any single desire, for it stands to single desires as system to systematized, as universal condition to particulars that are conditioned, as scheme of recurrence that supervens upon the materials of desires and the efforts to meet them.”

⁵³ Lonergan, *Collection* 110.

⁵⁴ Lonergan, *Insight* 538; see 538-539.

⁵⁵ Lonergan, *Insight* 539.

⁵⁶ See Eric Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics in Modernity without Restraint*, *The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin*, **5**, ed. Manfred Henningsen (Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 2000) 112, 129, 131, 220.

⁵⁷ See Bernard Lonergan, *Collection* 108-113 at 109-110.

⁵⁸ Lonergan, “The Problem of Liberation,” *Insight* 643-656.

⁵⁹ Lonergan, *Insight* 657-708.

⁶⁰ Lonergan, *Insight* 709-51.

⁶¹ See St Augustine: “God judged it better to draw good out of evils than not to allow evils to exist.” *Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity* 27, PL40: 245.

⁶² Lonergan, *Insight* 765-768.

⁶³ Lonergan, *Insight* 765: “At the same time, our first eighteen chapters were followed by a nineteenth and twentieth that revealed the inevitability

with which the affirmation of God and the search of intellect for faith arise out of a sincere acceptance of scientific presuppositions and precepts.”

⁶⁴ Immanuel Kant, “What Is Enlightenment?” in *Kant on History*, ed. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Library of Liberal Arts/Bobbs-Merrill, 1977) 3-10.

⁶⁵ In Immanuel Kant’s *Groundwork for a Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) the categorical imperative (“act only on the maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law”) to the supporting formula of humans as ends in themselves (the human being and in general every rational being exists as an end in itself, not merely as a means to be used by this or that will at its discretion” [79], and of the Kingdom of Ends (“By a *kingdom* I understand a systematic union of various rational beings through common laws” [83]).

⁶⁶ See Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason in Practical Philosophy*, trans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 174: “The sensible nature of rational beings in general is their existence under empirically conditioned laws, and is thus, for reason, *heteronomy*. The supersensible nature of the same beings, on the other hand, is their existence in accordance with laws that are independent of any empirical condition and thus belong to the *autonomy* of pure reason.” Again, 193: “all precepts of pure practical reason have to do only with the *determination of the will*, not with natural conditions for *carrying out its purpose ...*”

⁶⁷ See Hans Jonas, “The Abyss of the Will: Philosophical Meditation on the Seventh Chapter of Paul’s Epistle to the Romans,” *Philosophical Essays. From Ancient Creed to Technological Man* (Chicago: University of Chicago, Midway Reprint, 1974) on I. Kant, *Religion Within the Limits of Mere Reason* trans. and ed. Allen Wood and George DiGiovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), where “radical evil” is characterized by being rooted in the freedom of moral choice. See 54: “a propensity to evil can only attach itself to the moral faculty of choice [*Willkür*]; 53-54: “the propensity for evil affects the use of freedom, the capacity for acting out duty—in short, the capacity for actually being autonomous.”

⁶⁸ See Pierre Manent, *Cours familier de philosophie politique* (Paris: Fayard, 2001) 321. Manent reminds us that for Thomas Aquinas human dignity is something with which we are endowed by God, insofar as we are each created as an *imago Dei* and so are able to freely obey the natural and divine law.

⁶⁹ Thierry de Duve, *Kant after Duchamp* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press/October Book, 1997) 352-368.

⁷⁰ de Duve, *Kant after Duchamp* 444. The rest of this paragraph depends especially on “L’Empire de la morale,” in Manent’s *Cours familier* 309-26.

⁷¹ Manent, *Cours familier* 321.

⁷² See the first two chapters of Alexandre Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit Assembled by Raymond Queneau*, ed. Allan Bloom, trans. James H. Nichols, Jr. (New York: Basic Books, 1969) 3-70.

⁷³ Recall that in *Understanding and Being*, Lonergan reformulates a technique used by Hegel in order to communicate what he is trying to do in *Insight* 11-13.

⁷⁴ See Pierre Manent, “The Modern State,” in *New French Thought: Political Philosophy*, ed. Mark Lilla (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994) 123-33 at 130.

⁷⁵ See Immanuel Kant, “Conjectural Beginning of Human History,” in *On History* 53-68 at 54 f.

⁷⁶ See Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in *On History* 85-135, especially Appendix II, 129-33.

⁷⁷ Kant, “Perpetual Peace: First Supplement” 106-14 at 112.

⁷⁸ Lonergan, *Insight* 749-50.

⁷⁹ Lonergan, *Insight* 556, footnote 3.

⁸⁰ See Eric Voegelin, “The Gospel and Culture,” *Published Essays 1966-1985*, *CWEV* 12, ed. Ellis Sandoz (Baton Rouge, LA: 1990) 172-212 at 176.

⁸¹ For more on this interpretation of early Heidegger, see my “Gadamer, the Hermeneutic Revolution, and Theology,” *The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer*, ed. Robert Dostal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 167-200 esp. 169-179.

⁸² Lonergan, *Insight* 715.

⁸³ See Martin Heidegger, “Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles [Anzeige der hermeneutische Situation],” ed. Hans-Ulrich Lessing, *Dilthey Jahrbuch* 6 (1989) 236-269 at 241.

⁸⁴ Lonergan, *Insight* 722.

⁸⁵ See Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953) 134.

⁸⁶ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 47, art. 3c.

⁸⁷ *Summa theologiae* I, q. 103, art. 2, ad 3.

⁸⁸ See Karl Rahner, *Spirit in the World* (London: Sheed and Ward/New

York: Herder & Herder, 1968); *Hearers of the Word* (London: Sheed and Ward/New York: Herder & Herder, 1969).

⁸⁹ See Bernard Lonergan, "The Natural Desire to See God," *Collection* 81-91.

⁹⁰ This position is more in correspondence with Lonergan's later position expressed in his essay, "Natural Knowledge of God," *A Second Collection*, eds. William F. J. Ryan and Bernard J. Tyrrell (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1974) 117-133, where he points out the implication of the distinction between the *de jure* problematic knowledge of God by unilluminated human reason and the *de facto* problematic of knowledge on the part of the human being as fallen and redeemed.

⁹¹ This is elaborated in Thesis 17 of *De Verbo Incarnato* [ad usum auditorum], (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1964) 552-593: "The Son of God became man, suffered, died, and rose again because divine wisdom ordained and divine goodness willed not to remove the evils of the human race by power, but to transform these same evils into a certain highest good in accord with the just and mysterious law of the cross" (552).

⁹² Lonergan, *Insight* 745.

⁹³ Lonergan, *Insight* 745.