

A REFORM OF CLASSROOM PERFORMANCE

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The focus of my attention in the first part of this essay is on a seemingly simple slogan, “When teaching children geometry one is teaching children children.” The slogan has, of course, more general forms: for geometry one can substitute any topic; for children one can substitute adult; and the adult can be oneself. I present it in the particular form because it is the form in which it emerged first for me. I happened at the time to be working on Husserl’s essay on geometry,¹ indeed working towards finding leads in it to the need for a division of labour in the study of geometry equivalent to that suggested by Bernard Lonergan for theology.² A similar need can be discerned in the study of education, and I will turn to that in the second and third parts of the essay. But my central interest is in presenting, in an elementary fashion, the meaning of my slogan.

First, let us pause over the phrase, “in an elementary fashion.” Students of Lonergan’s view of the dynamics of knowing and doing will immediately suspect that I wish to get quickly to the heart of the matter, “The Elements of Meaning.”³ Certainly, yes, I – or rather the collaboration that is discussed in parts 2 and 3 – will point there eventually: but getting there quickly is an illusion that is under attack in this article. My approach here involves no presupposition other than the patent fact that we educate humans differently from animals. That difference is captured by the difference between the normal word *sensible* and my neologism *sensAble*.⁴ Humans are sensible; animals are *sensible*: a rather innocuous distinction that I would hope is generally acceptable. The general acceptability is key to my present effort to reach a new pragmatism of educational collaboration, caught in the subtitle of the book referred to in note 1. The new pragmatism is particularly significant when we move, in parts 2 and 3, to the issue of a general reform of education. In those sections a broader perspective regarding cultural fragmentation and educational implementations is indicated which will throw light on peculiarities that pertain to

Part 1. Because of this, you may well wish to peruse Part 2 first to get a sense of the changed and changing grounds of an operable philosophy of education. Part 1, however, generates a preliminary context for the reflections of Part 2, and that in two senses. It tackles the problem of classroom reform in a particular zone and in a way that resonates with the experience of good teaching, but in doing this it weaves in a certain number of complexities which gradually broadens the context towards the issue of the larger long-term reform dealt with in Parts 2 and 3. Part 3 brings the reflection into the fuller context of philosophy of education and concludes to some practical possibilities. I am making an effort there to state as plainly and starkly as possible the two layers of practical possibilities dealt with in the previous two sections. So, what I said above of Part 2 may be true here also: you may well benefit from starting with Part 3!

Finally, there are the endnotes. They are at times dense, but they leave the text more readable while still providing leads to the larger context.

1. A Classroom Reform

The important word in this subtitle is “A.” What I aim at is an immediately implementable practice in the sense that some teachers can venture, or adventure, this way in some classes. Indeed some teachers already do: one of the reasons that I ventured into mathematical studies originally was an unforgettable school-teacher, Kit Carroll, that incarnated interest, within himself and in us, as he diagrammed and talked in those last two years of my schooling, 1948-50, about the various branches of mathematics. We all know the type: they have some sense – should I say sensibility? – of the right tone, the right image, and furthermore the sense is vibrant, contagious. Kit Carroll may well have mused over his teaching methods, but he had a natural enthusiasm that echoed in his voice and a natural talent for reaching sixteen-year-olds. Might we identify that talented enthusiasm, perhaps buried in ourselves, so that there be a shift in the statistics of the occurrence of good teaching? We are looking, to inflict a terrible pun, for an

Educational Kit.

I immediately return to the meaning of “an” and “A.” I seek, not some definite Kit, some general reform: I wish only to express a possible shift in my teacher-readers – and for some teachers, merely the joy of finding in print something that they could have written better themselves. So, I am reminded of Lonergan’s reflections on economic reform. As in education, so in economic theory and practice, there are many ills. “But I do not think there is any need to flog a whole row of dead horses; a flick at a particularly nauseating one is enough; indeed a wink is as good as a nod.”⁵ I wrote above of talent “perhaps buried in ourselves.” We have come a long way since 1950, and the way cannot be accepted as altogether positive. Bureaucracy and computerization come to mind. I recall Lonergan commenting vehemently in the 1970s on the pressures put by bureaucrats and administrators on teachers: “get them out of the classrooms, and let the teachers teach!” I recall too the difference between my first university teaching of mathematical physics in the late 1950s and my final years of teaching philosophy in the 1990s. In the 1950s we were indeed allowed to teach, and indeed encouraged to raise standards; in the final years, meetings, committees, reports, evaluations, cancered the teaching. And, of course, there was the pressure to lower standards to keep bodies in class.

All that is grist for Part 2, but it is as well to bring it to mind here. I was fortunate in my career: a present reader may be less fortunate, may in fact have the talent and enthusiasm that I write of deeply buried, buried in the training of a B.Ed. Program – I am thinking now of the deadening effect of courses in that program in my own Canadian University – or buried even before that in bad schooling. All this prior to the funereal disservice of bureaucratic operations and the mortician-products that pass for texts in the late school years and in universities.⁶ Perhaps you, my present reader, are such a victim, “a native bewilderment.... unsure of the way through the maze of philosophies.... suffering..., unmotivated..., threatened...”?⁷ Perhaps you are a truncated subject? “The neglected subject does not know himself. The truncated subject not only does not know himself, but also is unaware of his ignorance.”⁸

I wish to make a discomfoting point here, for those who have read that last quotation before, for those who are happy with my citing of Lonergan, for those who are happy to hear that the heart of my pointing is towards the frontispiece of the book *Insight*, a quotation from Aristotle that includes the key word *phantasmasi*. Then you are, so to speak, “with me”: we have here a key doctrine of Lonergan, “insight into phantasm.” But perhaps you are ignorant, and unaware of your ignorance, of what is meant by *phantasm*?⁹ I have heard many dull lectures on the topic of insight into phantasm. Perhaps you were the giver, or are the product, of such lectures?

My deeper discomfoting point, then, is that we are a truncated culture – I write particularly of Western culture, but the disease spreads easily, and besides there were early practitioners, like Panini, of rigid and false objectifications¹⁰ - is that truncatedness is the state of present linguistically-competent humanity. If we are to seriously tackle the reform, an axial reorientation of humanity, then we had best seek some sense of the deformation. “The social situation deteriorates cumulatively.”¹¹ “Philosophers for at least two centuries, through doctrines on politics, economics and education, and through ever further doctrines, have been trying to remake man, and have done not a little to make human life unlivable.”¹² Our difficulty is to read these quotations seriously, somehow, in spite of our sickness.¹³ New slogans, like ever further doctrines of Lonerganism, can simply add to the disease other components of what I call the *Doctrinaire’s Disease*.¹⁴

Integral consciousness, like genuine elderhood, is at present a type of evolutionary sport. Fragmentation of consciousness, easily identifiable in the pattern of emergence of Greek drama in the fifth century B.C., has deeper roots in the evolution of written language, colonizes¹⁵ our neurodynamics so as to ensure that such integrity and elderhood remain exceptional. So, Maslow’s statistic remains valid for the new century, and Proust’s perspective of the 1920s on the unaged old is incarnated in our homes and in unhallowed halls of learning: “not really aged, but faded eighteen-year olds....”¹⁶ Perhaps our central task in this generation is to make it plausible for the present children and grandchildren to grow up to sense all

this: our central task, then, is to teach children children, whatever else we teach them.

Such a teaching is something of a disculturation, going against the notion that schooling is primarily a culturation. One can hear here, no doubt, echoes of Ivan Illich and his ilk: the call for a de-schooling of society. But that is not my call here: rather am I calling to the odd individual who has the soul, is the seed, of an evolutionary sport. It would be good, too, if such an individual also had that existential sense of present horrors: but that sense has to be under the control of a larger meaning, indeed an axial meaning that grounds long-term optimism.¹⁷ That control, as I noted at the end of the Introduction, is the topic of the other sections. But bear with me, noting that at least I am writing towards definite effects rather than generating some new theoretic. So, I slip back from the central task suggested at the end of the previous paragraph to home in on some small percentage of my readers who are willing and able to take up some features of my challenge. That challenge is to implement yourself, or to influence effectively [(suasively, with authority)]¹⁸ others, to have a shot at getting my slogan into the classroom.

So we are almost ready to home in on the fostering of the practice that lurks in the slogan. It only remains to pause realistically over the concrete context of that practice at present. First, recall the earlier point: we are only tackling one piece of a larger problem. That larger problem for some teachers is represented by trying to hold attention, keeping the noise level down in class. Some teachers are lucky enough to be teaching in a culture of discipline: but then the larger problem is still there, of holding or fostering interest.

Granted at least partially favorable classroom circumstances, we teachers know that catching, fostering, holding the supposedly native interest is the name of the game. Further asking what is, and how to, **interest** is the key methodological question. Notice, here, my twist on Aristotle's beginning of his *Metaphysics*: I have added a pragmatic bent to his basic claim, but the claim is worth repeating here. "All men naturally desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we take in the senses.... We prefer sight to almost everything else. The reason is that this, most


of all the senses, makes us know and brings to light many differences between things.”¹⁹ In the contemporary classroom, the delight may be elsewhere than on the topic, natural desire or not. So, there is the increased significance of the how to question. I refrain here from deviating to the complexities involved in switching from ‘topic’ to ‘teacher’ to bring out possibilities and probabilities of the focusing of desire: that is a whole other area of incarnate meaning, indeed of the teacher as artist if not as wizard or witch!²⁰ What I want to do is home in on geometry, on one famous theorem of Euclid, in order to give a paradigm of the possibility of lifting focus, interest, even delight, regarding a sensed problem.

So, I begin with the diagram shown on the next page, and pose a question – to you, of course, not to a possible class – a question about the relations between the different shapes. It would take a diversion into another essay to do this properly.²¹ That essay would be a curious expression, with relative adequacy²² and regular side-remarks on method, of a good teaching of Pythagoras’ Theorem. For example, one might use in a present class the phrase “let us raise the question.” The shift to adequate linguistic feedback²³ requires efforts to subjectivize this: raising, posing, etc. need to be replaced by more luminous references to the present inquiring subjects. So, above I used the standard phrase: “pose a question, to you of course.” But did it, does it? How does one raise a question in another, raise the core of sensability, in a group of fourteen year olds? There are issues here that reach into the toxic molecules of present living, but we must skim over them and stay on a very elementary level. But you get the point, the pointing? If you are familiar with, in comprehending control of, this presentation of Pythagoras’ Theorem, then you enjoy the read: if you are not then either you rise as a quest, or you pretend to read by reading on.²⁴

Am I over-optimistic in assuming that you are now reading with me, us together seeking to share the glory of an insight?²⁵

We ask together, What are the relations between the shapes inside the square whose side is **a**?

We have to assume – or backtrack to intussuscept – some previous elementary geometry. There is the area **a**²; there is the



area $(b - c)^2$; there are four areas $\frac{1}{2}(b \cdot c)$. Does any of that bother you? Bother a class? There are, indeed, bothersome aspects at various levels,²⁶ where *bothersome* is taken to be a welcome word. But do you recall teachers who did not wish to be bothered, for example, with the bright student who wished to understand why the algorithm for

getting square roots worked?!

At all events, a variable amount of messing is required to get to the serene delight that follows the seizing of, the being seized by, the **appearance** of Pythagoras' Theorem. That seizing must be soaked in, intussuscepted. It is a deep delight, that can be renewed endlessly in its cosmic resonances, in a spacetime that slips past it, in a Fermat's Theorem that gives it new life. Am I out of my mind here in exaggerations? I am merely pursuing the functional specialty of foundations in its central role of **Fantasy**, of challenging present unlife with future probabilities.²⁷ It is well to bear in mind that, as Toynbee and Jaspers would hold, we may be just setting out in human evolution, and to bear in mind the fact that "the habitable dry land surface of the biosphere consists of a single continent, Asia, together with its peninsulas and off-shore islands.... The three largest of Asia's off-shore islands are Africa and the two Americas."²⁸ The method of communicating Pythagoras's Theorem that I have used comes from India, a millennium and a half after the maturing of Greek geometry. "Thus Bhaskara (born 1114 A.D.) simply draws four right-angle triangles equal to the original one inwards, one on each side of the hypotenuse, and says 'see!', without even adding that inspection shows that

$$a^2 = 4(\frac{1}{2} [bc]) + (b - c)^2 = b^2 + c^2$$
²⁹

Might not there emerge new images of and in Cosmopolis in another millennium and a half that would lift the global folk to see the theorems of scientific and sacred searchers with strange small adjustments of classes?,

“see karma
 in the fall of a tubercular sparrow,
 in the newspaper deaths in Burma
 of seventy-one men, women and children;
 actually see the One in the Many,
 losing a lifetime of double-vision
 with one small adjustment
 of glasses”³⁰

At this stage you are perhaps discontent with the reflections I am trying to share. I have leaped from a simple illustration of mathematical teaching to a distant possibility and probability. For one thing, you may not be mathematically inclined. I teach chemistry, you might say, and am interested in improving my teaching or promoting that teaching in my school; I teach history, or English, or botany, or home economics. What of these subjects? And I must agree: if by subjects you mean other topics, then each of them moves us to a different ballpark of difficulties and strategies.

Which brings me to a first pointer to the possibilities of collaboration, differentiation, and divided labour that belong with the project of the other two parts of the essay: my present actual audience is indeterminate. Should I not have submitted this essay to a journal of mathematical education, one dealing indeed with the late school grades? That points to the need of the status quo. But the richer pointing is towards another possibility. Would it not be magnificent if communications of a good teacher regarding particular teaching to particular apprentice teachers was what I might call a village activity, supported or mediated by a structured global understanding that yet was concrete in its suggestiveness? A sort of resource community network that local needs could benefit from, but incarnately?³¹ Let us leave that magnificence for the moment and take a different tack about the ‘change of subject.’

If by *subject* you meant – which likely you did not – the subjects in the classroom, teacher and pupils, then there is no change of subjects when the topic changes. This twist leads to two points. First, the children and still children: so teaching children children remains the same topic. It does not vary from class to class. But secondly the twist brings us back to you the teacher or the

administrator, and the question becomes awkward, even embarrassing. Think of a usual question, “What subject are you teaching?” Think of the odd response were you to claim, “Well, I am basically teaching children and myself.”³² Especially if your listener was astute enough to take *teaching* with the twist of reference both to content and learner.

And, to shift the discomfoting twist, What subject am I teaching, or at least writing **to**, here? As I type this I recall with amusement Lonergan’s amusement when he read my introduction to a few of his key essays: “What then is Lonergan getting at? The uncomfortable answer is that Lonergan is getting at you.”³³ And, as I look up the reference I find that I continued there in a relevant fashion: “And my uncomfortable answer grows in value as an introduction to the degree that it causes the reader to pause in the self-questioning, ‘Do I really want to be got at?’ The classical system-building theologian certainly does not want to be ‘got at,’ be turned towards some sort of self-examination.” And what of the system-building educator or philosopher of education? The question brings us to the full discomfoting meaning of my slogan. To accept that slogan is to accept that system-building in which the system does not include the subject building is now to be considered – I mean implementationally of course – as a dead end. It always was a dead end: surely that is what Socrates was all about?³⁴

2. A Global Collaborative Division of Labour

The mention of Socrates and the implicit reference to Plato’s presentation of his attitude lifts our discussion into the context of history and the dialectic of educational practice and policies. You may well have noted, in your reading of section one, that I was really only repeating Socrates’ implicit advice about teaching: he, too, draws a square self-reflectively, and draws out a glimpse of relations in the student in a manner quite foreign to the strategy, in geometry, of rote learning that I, and perhaps you, suffered from in some of our bad schooling. Is this, then, an inevitable pattern of education, its history, its future? Or is there some possibility of a global lift, pivoting perhaps on something

like a Marxist slogan, “Educators of the world, Unite!”?

Now I would have you pause over the suggestion that I do not mean here, “good teachers of the world unite,” but educators in general and undoubtedly you see the grim problem, a problem grounded in the incarnate and institutional presence of the truncated subjectivity mentioned in Part 1. Bernard Lonergan writes of the importance of art as he describes the present educational crisis, in a quotation worth repeating: “What I want to communicate in this talk about art is the notion that art is relevant to concrete living, that it is an exploration of the potentialities of concrete living. That exploration is extremely important in our age, when philosophers for at least two centuries, through doctrines on politics, economics, education, and through ever further doctrines, have been trying to remake man, and have done not a little to make human life unlivable.”³⁵ The root problem is institutionalized, boned-in, doctrines and policies. Certainly art is important in surviving these institutions, and may even be vital in stirring the molecules of truncated subjectivity towards challenging outer institutions on deeper subjective institutional levels.³⁶ But in itself it can sadly be recognized as little more than escape from “all sorts of mortmain”³⁷: certainly, as Seamus Heaney argues, there can be *The Redress of Poetry*,³⁸ but to shift the structures of unlivability there must be what I call *The Redress of Poise*.³⁹ What poise am I talking about? The poise I am talking about is quite remote, and its remoteness and character as a pattern of enlightenment beyond present East and West will be a topic elsewhere.⁴⁰ So let us approach the matter here more pragmatically, lightly.

I mentioned deeper institutional levels. Let us have a burst of optimism and envisage three such levels of depth that would correspond to the recognized relationship between the threesome, Policy, Planning and Executive Reflection. The burst of optimism relates intimately to the possibility of slowly but efficiently cultivating precise levels of depth, but even superficially⁴¹ one can admit a sequence of mediation: policy grounds planning; planning grounds executive reflection; executive reflection seeks to ground actual operations. The key problem is the efficient cultivation of precise levels of depth, quite remote from the present ethos

regarding the meaning of the words *policy* and *doctrine*.

That present ethos would, quite spontaneously, have us hold – indeed, hold us truncatedly within – the view that we all know a common and commonsense meaning of the words *policy*, *doctrine*, whether we are dealing with government parties, business practices, church beliefs or educational directives. Is it not, perhaps, your own spontaneous perspective? Was it not, perhaps, the spontaneous perspective of Lonergan’s audience of 1959, when he spoke of doctrines in education? Indeed, is it not a predominant perspective of his disciples regarding the massive doctrinal shift on education that was his discovery of February 1965 of the division of labour that is the present topic? And I might conclude this catalogue of horrors with the suggestion that I am reviving here a doctrinal position held by Lonergan, one that is likely to embarrass. “Doctrines that are embarrassing will not be mentioned in polite company.”⁴²

The core issue is the future institutionalizing of a new homeliness, so that taken for granted in a creative minority is a set of remote and differentiated meanings of such words as *policy* and *planning*, or equivalently *doctrine* and *system*. The Systematic or Planning thinking and “understanding to be reached is to be on the level of one’s times.... it has to be at home in modern science, modern scholarship, modern philosophy.”⁴³ And that understanding can come to be “quite a homely affair”⁴⁴ only through a reluctant, “bloody entrance” of quite novel differentiations of consciousness. This is definitely a sense in which “it is quite difficult to be at home in transcendental method.”⁴⁵

But let us struggle towards a notion of the fresh homeliness by picking up on the elementary pointers of Part 1. There, apart from the complex contextualization, the presentation was of a simple Socratic strategy – or policy or doctrine – regarding the teaching of a particular type of geometry at a particular level of education. It is, if you like, executive advice to a subgroup of teachers that may well be reluctant listeners or may on the other hand be struggling against truncated institutions, including their own molecular disorders. Might it be effective?

Suppose that such advice became more common, reached

into other areas of education, found its way into the perspective of parents and towns and urban regions? Suppose that such particular and precise advice, doctrine or policy, emerged regarding the teaching of English or calculus or history or chemistry or school economics or thermodynamics? But how are the suppositions to become a reality? Most immediately, by the random cultural shift of educational sports “reading the book of themselves”⁴⁶ and writing that particular advice in helpful detail and with some success in cultivating the linguistic feedback that lurks in the slogan “when teaching children geometry one is teaching children children.” One is teaching oneself oneself through a struggle with “identification.”⁴⁷ Further, that self-teaching is a cycling of reflection and performance, but it must be concrete, particular: common sense bowing to the need of an absent homely uncommon sense, “.... picking out accurately the elements that are to be unified or related. Once the insight is reached, one is able to find in one’s own experience just what it is that falls under the insight’s grasp and what lies outside it. However, ability is one thing, and performance is another. Identification is performance.”⁴⁸

We are here at the heart, the hearth, of our homely home-seeking optimism. Let us follow this clue to a solution not only of the problem of differentiation of doctrines and policies from which we began but to the entire historical problem, of effective and progressive education.

I began in Part 1 with the incarnate, performing, solution to the problem of teaching mathematics: a single teacher doing it well and my pun there raised the issue to that of an **Educational Kit**. The first shift is the personal shift to thematize, in some tentative and perhaps even shabby fashion, one’s successful performance. The shift, obviously, must at this stage be random, but lucky in the fullest sense.⁴⁹ The luck will have a pressure, of embarrassment if nothing else, towards promising thematics that will yield to enlightened revision. But we must not be hurried here. We are reaching optimistically towards a full global solution, a solution that will reach out to every school, every teacher, within an effective control of emergent probability. So, we are looking, in adventuresome fantasy, towards a yield of a revision that is at

present out of sight. We are looking towards a yield that is quite beyond Lonergan's reflections on criticism and revision in his early work, *Insight*: "A first principle of criticism is the demand for a universal viewpoint. Moreover, the demand possesses the requisite dynamic character. For though a contributor fails to present his results in terms of the protean notion of being, a critic can proceed from that notion to a determination of the contributor's particular viewpoint, he can indicate how the particularism probably would not invalidate the contributor's work and, on the other hand, he can suggest to others in the contributor's special field the points on which his work may need revision."⁵⁰ That indeed is a powerful principle of criticism and revision, but the requirement of a universal viewpoint, in Lonergan's sense, is just as unrealistic as a demand that is the requirement for doctrinal luminosity with which we began this section. Paradoxically, the yield I am looking for is much less of a demand than either of these, yet radically more effective. I am looking for a fuller yet humbler reaching for the reality and the meaning of identification, even if it falls short of the full richness of the technical sense that Lonergan suggests.

So it seems best to focus in on the broader treatment of appropriation that is the context of that technical reflection. I must note, however, that there is a difficult foundational book to be written on this topic: all I can do is throw out some suggestions.

The issue is the appropriation of the truth, a single complex truth, regarding history, both history as written and history as lived. For the moment, I focus here on history as lived. The complex truth is the truth regarding the ongoing differentiations of human consciousness. It is a truth most clearly faced by Herbert Butterfield, and his conclusion regarding the central historical differentiation of consciousness is worth quoting in full: "It is the so-called 'scientific revolution,' popularly associated with the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, but reaching back in an unmistakably continuous line to a period much earlier still. Since that revolution overturned the authority in science not only of the middle ages but of the ancient world since it ended not only in the eclipse of scholastic philosophy but in the destruction of Aristotelian physics – it outshines everything since the rise of Christianity and reduces

the Renaissance and the Reformation to the rank of mere episodes, mere internal displacements, within the system of medieval Christendom.... our customary periodization of European history has become an anachronism and an encumbrance."⁵¹ A similar point, but in regard to a wider range of differentiations, haunts the five volumes of Eric Voegelin's work on *Order and History*, but the haunting becomes most explicit at the beginning of Volume Four. But my point here is that we are now on the edge of a quite new set of differentiations of consciousness, named thematically by Lonergan, and about the new set I can more firmly claim what Butterfield claimed about the scientific revolution: it outshines every other shift of differentiation in the axial period, giving a new structure of periodization to history, a new luminosity of metaphysics, implementation, revelation.⁵²

Lonergan's achievement is an achievement of a set of personal identifications that sublates the perspectives of both Butterfield and Voegelin, that remain to be performatively appropriated. My concern here is not with the full range of that achievement but with the single most important component of the achievement, his breakthrough of February 1965, when he gave creative heuristic order to the set of eight fragmentations of consciousness that have emerged in all areas of human inquiry in the centuries since the Renaissance.⁵³ What is missing in the work of his disciples is any serious effort at performative identification. It is time to make a beginning, and a beginning suggests itself in the context of classroom reform.

So we come back to the question of such teaching as is recognized in a commonsense fashion as of good quality. One might, in a developed perspective on the differentiated process that is the focus of my heuristic, identify such teachings with "the events" – perhaps neglected events, like the events of the scientific revolution recognized by Butterfield but neglected by present philosophy and theology – of the key page, page 250, in *Method in Theology*. But we are imagining here a fresh start of the cycling that is called by Lonergan "functional specialization".

The first functional step is the gathering of accounts, self-accountings, of such teaching.⁵⁴ Next, there is the complex and

telling function of interpreting the gathered accounts: it tells, for instance, of the teaching competence, or lack thereof, of those who seek to perform as communicating interpreters in Lonergan's specialized sense of *Insight* 17.3.1.

Here I am at a loss, and Lonergan scholars certainly will appreciate my problem. In the first footnote to Lonergan's own treatment in *Method in Theology* of "Interpretation" as a specialty he speaks of the general topic as "enormously complex" and points to the future task of redistributing among the specialties his earlier treatment of that general topic. I must continue then with a light, helpful, suggestive touch.

One may muse satirically over such comments on education departments as "those who can, teach; those who can't, lecture on teaching." "Understanding Oneself," the fourth aspect of interpreting or understanding a text,⁵⁵ will become increasingly a topic and will expose cases of the blind reading the one-eyed or the clear-sighted. There is the task of stating the meaning of the text: but can one state intelligently the meaning of a text on good teaching without understanding good teaching and can one understand good teaching without being a good teacher? Embarrassing, isn't it? "Doctrines that are embarrassing will not be mentioned in polite company." Is it not discomforting to ask, How many professors of education can teach well? Is it not even more discomforting to ask, Do I teach well?

But my key pointing here is towards the identification of functional specialist identification, and it can be neatly pointed to in this context. I said, in the last paragraph, that understanding oneself will become increasingly a topic. But it is not a topic of this specialty. Indeed, it does not emerge as a thematized topic until the fourth functional specialty, Dialectic, which "will make conversion a topic, and thereby promote it,"⁵⁶ including a conversion to an understanding of one's own bad teaching and its reform. Nor does this specialized functional interpretation include comments on the quality of the teaching described in the text: that too is a topic of Dialectic. Nor does the specialty include comparative comments: these belong technically under the sub-division *Comparison* mentioned on p. 250 of *Method in Theology*.

Notice that these points expose a general weakness in Lonergan studies that attempt interpretations of Lonergan's own work; regularly such efforts are laced with sentences that are evaluative or comparative.

If you are with me here you are beginning to get a sense of the difficulty in identifying this specialization of function in understanding the successful past and present. We are, in fact, up against that quite new differentiation of consciousness that is the central human and academic differentiation shift of what I call the Axial Period. It solves the problem of implementation that haunted Plato, that mars that great work *Insight*.⁵⁷ It constitutes a guarantee of the recycling of the axial challenge of Socrates that emerged at the conclusion of Part 1. It is the defining structure of future philosophy of education, indeed, of philosophy as a unified efficient enterprise.

But it would be foolish of me, and bad teaching, to elaborate further on these few hints. "Identification is performance" and so far there is no performance in this specialty.⁵⁸ My interest, in this decade, is in beginnings. For me, this is THE topic in education. What, then, of Lonergan's work, *Topics in Education*? Certainly, these are topics in education as they are topics in any field of culture. But these topics must be moved into the recycling process of functional specialization if they are to blossom into classroom implementation. Furthermore, the book suffers, as do many of Lonergan's presentations, from the need to popularize, make palatable. And, of course, it suffers as a book on education by really being related to Lonergan's need to escape from Rome in the Summer, using the lectures to push forward his own searchings. As he remarked to me in the early 1970s, commenting on his reluctance to have the lectures published, "I was just trying to work out a few things."

It would be a further foolishness in me to try to summarily indicate the general need and value of the fresh beginning that is the effort to implement functional specialization in all and any area of culture. It was the topic of my most recent book, and it is the heart of my concern in the present million word project of 117 monthly *Cantowers*.⁵⁹

So I return to the reflections of Part 1 and to the slogan “When teaching children geometry, one is teaching children children.” The slogan embodies a call for the immediate feedback that is the character of generalized empirical method in operation, and I would note that this feedback will itself generate a new linguistic feedback in the classroom constituting a vibrant empirical classroom presence of subjectivity in the as-yet distant third stage of meaning. But the immediate need is for good teachers to identify how their teaching reaches towards that future and to thematize it in particular performances. There is also, of course, the need for poor teachers, especially those in the grip of some alienating orthodoxy, to struggle for, towards, within, such feedback. This latter struggle is not easy to invite or initiate, but it will be encouraged by the gradual acceptance of various non-alienating doctrines, such as that of the slogan.

We are back to the topic of doctrines that emerged early in this second part of the article, to the “root problem of institutionalizing....,”⁶⁰ “the key problem of cultivating levels of depth...”⁶¹ The key problem is to be solved by the cultivation of the division of labour that is the topic of this section; the root problem is a fruit of that labour, essentially the gradual impact of a developed eighth functional specialty, which will, surely by the end of the millennium, give rise to the presence of an educated and educating elderhood in every village, paralleling Lonergan’s hope for economics, where he writes thus of the transformation to be envisaged. “It will give new hope and vigor to local life.... it will make the practical economist as familiar a professional figure as the doctor, the lawyer, or the engineer.”⁶² That is the ultimate fruit of the Educational Kit we are seeking. Meantime we must rely on a counter-culture of the random occurrence - but with slowly improving statistics - of educational sports: not the truncated optimism of a de-schooling or re-schooling of society but a persuasive inner reorientation. So, you can see that the root problem depends on the proximate efforts encouraged by the reflections of Part 1, and the key problem is the problem raised in Part 2 and solved in thin heuristic by the descriptive naming of functional specialization. Certainly I would hope that there are readers that

recognize themselves, or perhaps their future selves, in the characters of Part 1: but my deeper hope is that some of my readers would share my conviction and optimism about the larger challenge of Part 2. In this second part I cut off my description of the emergent task very deliberately at the problems raised in cultivating the second specialty of interpretation. Only slowly, by shabby performance, will the consequent problems of history, dialectic and foundations, emerge. From the resulting foundations, a matter of present fantasy, there can result layered meanings of policies, doctrines and metadoctrines that can lift our human struggle for a better life beyond the brutal commonsense eclecticism and bias that provides us now with glittering entertainment for the few, hunger for the many, global boredom, crippled worship and clashing arms.

3. The Two Practical Journeys to the Future

The two Journeys relate to the two previous parts of this essay. In terms of Lonergan's works they involve (a) some personal watered-down version of his book *Insight*; (b) some communal version of the undertaking of the project of *Method in Theology*, chapter five. It is best for me to begin with (b), and move to (a) in a conclusion.

I have been, unsuccessfully, pointing out the need for the Journeying (b) since 1970, when I presented at the International Florida Lonergan Conference a paper on the need for a division of labour in the study of music.⁶³ Since then I have written on the same need in a range of fields: literary studies, economics, physics, business studies, linguistics, physics, geometry.⁶⁴ What is my point, my pointing? It is to a need which is quite obvious to me, increasingly obvious to serious academic specialists. It is a need that has been emerging especially in the past century. The need emerges from fragmentation and reduplication of effort in each discipline, from basic confusions about progress in each discipline or even the character of the discipline and its progress. In this section, I wish to be as simple as possible, for I wish desperately to see a beginning of the needed collaboration. And part of my simple

appeal here is to draw sketchy attention to the need as it is manifested in the study of education. Already, however, there is a complexity which you can easily acknowledge: education ranges over all disciplines and all periods of life. We can't go into details about that, but you can appreciate that it strengthens my point: if each discipline needs division of labour, then a discipline dealing with these disciplines probably needs it too.

But let us stick with general reflections on education: we have the convenient example of Lonergan's reflections already quoted. Shift the general reflection to ask, What is going on in the journals of education? No need for detail here, since I wish you to pause only over a broad impression. If you are not "in" education then you may be a philosopher or theologian, and you can just as well reflect on journals there. You may already know where I am going. In any one journal, and certainly in any group of journals, you will probably find work delving into the past, work reaching out to the future. The two directions may be meshed in a particular article, such as "The Relevance of Whitehead's Educational Theory to the Structure of Elementary Schools." But there are also detailed articles which focus on one zone: "Railways and the Decay of Indian Handcraft Education: 1860-1900," or "Educational Comments in the Analects of Confucius." It does not take long to find that there are eight distinguishable areas in the mess: one can dig out new material relevant to education; one can push for its meaning; one can have a broader interest in locating something or someone in history; often with a muddled reach for relevance; an article can debate and compare viewpoints, "Dewey and Brunner on Pragmatic Content." My reader familiar with Lonergan's suggested division of labour will notice that I have skimmed through the first four of his divisions, but note also that the named articles are not ordered by the division. It is a good exercise to read, sentence by sentence, an article that claims to be research or history or whatever and find that the author has more than one interest or purpose. Can you imagine what this would do to an efficient institution, like a nuclear plant or an automobile factory? Think of the nuclear danger and waste, the hazardous lemons. And perhaps there is no necessity to illustrate the muddles of policy, planning and executive decisiveness

that are internal to the literature on the future of education? Although these areas bring forth much deeper problems.⁶⁵

But you are with me so far? I am simply bringing Adam Smith's point beyond the pin to the pen: "The division of labour, so far as it can be introduced, occasions, in every art, a proportionable increase in the productive power of labour."⁶⁶ Wouldn't it be wonderful if there could emerge a global collaboration that would click together in function like a pin factory or even like McDonald's global *M*? But how does one get such a collaboration started? My slogan is, "If something is worth doing, it is worth doing badly." The difficulty, I suppose, is to get oneself up to glimpsing the problem and the solution in their full global dimensions. This, perhaps, is the difficulty of Lonergan disciples, many of whom see functional specialization as simply a handy way of ordering their own work. It goes far beyond that. It is, with his economics as a perhaps distant second, his main magnificent contribution to the history of human progress.⁶⁷ As I noted above, by it he succeeded in solving, in embryo and modestly, both Plato's and his own problem of the *Implementation* of a policy for the good life. He did so only within the context of his own discipline, but he was not unaware – tired as he was in the decades after 1965 – of its wider scope.

So, how do we start doing it badly? Some of my own suggestions and my present effort are detailed in my Website writing, *Cantower III*, available 1 June 2002, for your perusal. It is a matter of individuals, secure enough in themselves and in their job, having a shot at doing a precise job on some topic in some of the eight suggested divisions.

And this brings me closer to the topic of Part 1, and to my view of "A Fresh Pragmatism." As already noted, this phrase is the subtitle of my recent book, *Pastkeynes Pastmodern Economics. A Fresh Pragmatism*, and it is the topic of the third, fifth and sixth chapters: "Inventing Pragmatics," "A Fresh Pragmatism in Education," "Proximate Pragmatics." The third chapter emphasizes two points. The first is what I have said above: there has emerged in the past centuries a fragmentation and dissipation of effort in every discipline – even in the apparently safe discipline of geometry

– that cry out for a convenient structure of collaboration. This becomes my first foundational category, and it has wide and strategic significance that we cannot enter into now.⁶⁸ However, there is no harm in drawing attention to its relation to an ancient Chinese aspiration: “The Master said, ‘In instruction there is no separation of categories.’ The Master said, ‘There is no point in people taking counsel together who follow different ways.’”⁶⁹ And so I come to my second point and my second category: the admonition to ‘Be Sensable,’ a neologistic admonition that nonetheless satisfies most views on education. These two categories are intended to replace the formidable list that Lonergan gives in *Method in Theology*. Why? In the first place, very few, if any, can claim to incarnate those categories: for instance, how many people, in or out of biology, have a decent perspective on the heuristics of development?⁷⁰ In the second place, the ills of our time and of axial time have to be met by people as they are, within the statistics of their present probabilities. What is to meet those ills is not some Husserlian axiomatics, nor some mighty challenge such as the book *Insight*, but people glimpsing some possible shift for the better, and having a shot at implementing that shift. Lonergan’s categories were Lonergan’s personal achievement: they have, in a key sense, little to do with the need for the division of labour that history has forced upon us, nor even with good teaching. So, we arrive at the viewpoint of Part 2 and Part 1 of this essay. Part 2 invites those thinking and writing on education to try to locate their work within the suggested division of labour. By *locate* I mean that, to the best of their ability, they try to hold, sentence by sentence, to the function that they think they are fulfilling. Am I interpreting Dewey on a particular area? Then I don’t go on to compare Dewey and Adler, or add illustrations of how it would effect local teaching, or even criticize it. These belong in another ballpark. For students of Lonergan there is an added challenge lurking in the question, What am I doing when I am *interpreting* Lonergan?⁷¹

And so I come back to Part 1 and its suggestion that those who consider themselves good – sensible – teachers invite themselves, or be invited, to thematize their own performance. This effort brings them back to the problem of themselves and their

own identity, but it also generates the stuff of research, the beginning of, or a freshening of, the cycle of collaboration. As I typed that last word I thought of two suggestions of collaboration, one thirty years ago, one sixty years ago. Thirty years ago there was the slogan 'Ongoing Collaboration' associated with the International Lonergan Conference in Florida: it never happened. Sixty years ago Lonergan concluded his article on "Finality, Love Marriage" with a request that it be a beginning of discussion: it failed.⁷² Might I suggest, especially to Lonergan followers perhaps thinking of 2004 as the centennial year of Lonergan's birth, that something definite be undertaken towards the implementation of functional specialization in the context of that occasion? Obviously I am interested in collaboration and would benefit from it in my decade-long *Cantower* struggle with our axial needs. *Cantowers IV and V* especially express the full deep need of our times, for the few crazy enough to move with Childe Harold towards the Dark Tower of a new pragmatic methodology,⁷³ to lead in the building of a Global bower for the human child.⁷⁴ But there is also the need for the many who, going against Lonergan's hope quoted immediately below, do not refuse half measures but are willing to search out partial solutions for this class and that, for this specialization or that, who are willing to do something worthwhile badly. With these qualifications I may end here with the conclusion of Lonergan's *Collection*: "Classical culture cannot be jettisoned without being replaced: and what replaces it cannot but run counter to classical expectations. There is bound to be formed a solid right that is determined to live in a world that no longer exists. There is bound to be formed a scattered left, captivated by now this, now that new development, exploring now this and now that new possibility. But what will count is a perhaps not numerous center, big enough to be at home in both the old and the new, painstaking enough to work out one by one the transitions to be made, strong enough to refuse half measures and insist on complete solutions even though it has to wait."

Notes

¹ I expand on this in P. McShane, *Pastkeynes Pastmodern Economics. A Fresh Pragmatism*, Axial Press, Halifax, 2002. Husserl's Essay on Geometry is available as an Appendix to his *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1970.

² B. Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, Darton, Longman and Todd, 1972, ch.5.

³ "The Elements of Meaning" is the title of the summary presentation of the topic in *Method in Theology*, chapter 3, section 7. They are the topic of the book *Insight*, with summary presentation in chapters 9 and 18. I included a diagrammatic presentation of them in Appendix A of Volume 18 of Lonergan's *Collected Works: Phenomenology and Logic*, University of Toronto Press, 2001, 322-3. That presentation serves to draw attention to (a) the modally distinguishable transcendental 'be adventurous,' the central dynamic of the forward-looking specialties; (b) the non-neglect of affectivity in the work *Insight*.

⁴ I introduced the neologism in *A Brief History of Tongue. From Big Bang to Coloured Wholes*, Axial Press, Halifax, 1999, as a strategy of introduction and of incarnating of the investigation. Only as I struggled with the work referred to in note 1 did I come to see its pragmatic significance, especially in avoiding a dogmatic nominalism of Lonergan enthusiasts. Later I exploited the term in the new edition of *Music That Is Soundless. A Fine Way for the lonely Bud A*, Axial Press, Halifax, 2002. The 'Bud A,' is, of course, the 'Ah(!)' of our sensibility.

⁵ B. Lonergan, *For A New Political Economy*, edited by P. McShane, University of Toronto Press, 1999, 36.

⁶ This raises another aspect of the reform of classroom performance that would take us off course here. But it seems worthwhile to repeat a remark I made in another context about a less-challenging following of Lonergan. "This following of Lonergan would be no mean achievement in so far as it grounded a democratic transformation of education. For example, in helping local children through their mathematics, chemistry etc., I am appalled at the bulky conceptualist-nominalist texts inflicted on them. Changing the teaching of one subject in one grade could be a solid lifetime's achievement." (*Economics for Everyone*, 173, note 29).

⁷ *Insight*, first page of chapter 14.

⁸ B. Lonergan, *A Second Collection*, Paulist Press, 1984, 73.

⁹ I would note – but this is for those who wish to push forward in a serious fashion with Lonergan's full challenge – that this is a key question, landing

one in that uncomfortable paragraph in the middle of page 287 of *Method in Theology* which includes the words “from such a broadened base one can go on” to re-write the first half of *Method in Theology*. The issue is the full explanatory metaviewpoint that would make dialogue with the contemporary world possible.

The strategic context of that viewpoint is a symbolization of what I call the first word of metaphysics, dealt with in *A Brief History of Tongue*, chapter 4, which opens up our searchings by reminding us that each of us – and our pupils! – are a functional organic unity designated heuristically as $f(p_i ; c_j ; b_k ; z_l ; u_m ; r_n)$, where the conjugates of our layered reality are indicated by the subscripts on e.g. p – physics – and the semicolons push you to control the aggregiform structure of those integral layers. How else are we to dialogue with people like Pert (note 13) and Ramachandran? (note 19, below) You may pause now over various other words besides *phantasm*. What, for example, do you mean by image, *feeling*, *dream*, *differentiation*, etc etc.

¹⁰ I am thinking here in particular about the foundations of grammar. On this, see John Benton, “Teaching English and Language Universals,” *Journal of Macrodynamical Analysis* (2) 2002, a Website journal: www.mun.ca/jmda.

¹¹ B. Lonergan, *Insight* 229[254]. I will thus refer to old and new editions of *Insight*.

¹² B. Lonergan, *Topics in Education*, University of Toronto Press, 1993, 232.

¹³ This is a difficult reality to come to grips with. It requires that one take seriously the point of the phrase quoted at note 11, and to place the decline in the context of axial considerations (see below, note 17). The sickness is in our molecules and nerves. For some help on this see Candace Pert, with a Foreword by Deepak Chopra, *Molecules of Emotion*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1999: see especially the index under *toxicity*.

¹⁴ Roughly, the *Doctrinaire's Disease* is mistaking map-reading for mountaineering. Discovering e.g. that the book *Insight* is doctrinal, a mapping, involves a good deal of discouraging climbing.

¹⁵ I borrow words and notion of colonization from Declan Kiberd, *Inventing Ireland. The Literature of the Modern Nation*, Harvard University Press, 1993. The index under *colonization* gives abundant references to the problems of colonized expression. To the issue of the redemptive character of such literatures as the Anglo-Irish, Anglo-Indian and Anglo-African there must be added the deeper problem of the false objectivity mentioned in note 10 above. A simple instance of false orientation, a colonization of Scotus' view of mind in almost all brands of educated English, is the

recurrence of phrases like “understanding the concept of,” “teaching the concept of,” “clarifying the concept of.” Such orientations murder the educational process: neither child nor adult mind fits this linguistic mold.

¹⁶ M. Proust, *Remembrance of Things Past*, Concluding section. This is the theme of the entire work, but it becomes focused in the final volume. It points to the absence of elderhood, a phenomenon of axial times.

¹⁷ My notion of an Axial Period sublates Jasper’s view of such a period between 600 B.C and 200 B.C. The axial period can be considered as a period of over 5,000 years (usefully, think of 2500 A.D. to 2500 B.C.) between the emergence of written languages and the emergence of the third stage of meaning. More on this in *A Brief History of Tongue*, chapter 1. See also below, notes 34 and 57.

¹⁸ On authority, see B. Lonergan “The Dialectic of Authority,” *A Third Collection*, Paulist Press, New York, 1986, 5-10. A key issue here is the unity of a science through its efficiency: see *Topics in Education*, 160. The deeper issue is the emergence of concrete probabilities of implementation, a problem that haunts *Insight* and is thematized partially in chapter seven, section 8. The word “implementation” occurs about ten times in the book, but never found its way into the index. (Fr. Crowe and I enjoy joking about our failed indices of *Insight* and *Method* respectively. Indexing is a case of doing something worthwhile badly. In my last conversation with Fr. Crowe he remarked with a twinkle, “there’s a lot more about feelings in the new index”.)

¹⁹ A contemporary Aristotle would reach, as he did then, for the best of contemporary efforts to understand sight. I have to hand, e.g., V.S. Ramachandran (with Sandra Blakelee), *Phantoms of the Brain. Probing the Mysteries of the Human Mind*, Morrow and Company, New York, 1998, who has a great deal to say that is relevant to education about the complexity and dominance of the neurodynamics of seeing. We are back at the issue raised by Lonergan in *Insight*: “...from biology to economics, or from economics to depth psychology, the defenders were left in the unenviable position of always arriving on the scene a little breathless and a little late” (733[755]). The message is repeated in the center of p. 287 of *Method in Theology*: “one can go on...”. Can one?; can you and I?

²⁰ The problem should be considered in the context of incarnate meaning as a challenge: see *Method in Theology* 3.6 and 14.1.

²¹ As it happens, today I received a communication from Professor Terry Quinn that he would undertake such a presentation. However, I call attention to him and his work as illustrating the type of reflection I am advocating here for teachers. His publication “The Calculus Campaign,” *Journal of Macrodynamical Analysis* (2) 2002 (www.mun.ca/jmda), is a

magnificent rescuing of the two fundamental theorems of the calculus from generations of bad textbook presentation.

²² It is vital to remember that expression and presentation are quite relative. Adequacy is a matter of occasion, but we are seeking here general heuristic underpinnings. On adequacy, see *Insight* 17.2.4, "Truth and Expression."

²³ "At a higher level of linguistic development, the possibility of insight is achieved by linguistic feedback, by expressing the subjective experience in words and as subjective." (*Method in Theology*, 88, note 34).

²⁴ My favorite context on the question of reading is Lonergan's Epilogue to his *Verbum. Word and Idea in Aquinas*, where he writes of the presuppositions of reading comfortably on.

²⁵ There is a need for a massive cultural transition to a psychology of leisure that is quite beyond present fantasy (see note 27). For instance, Lonergan's theory of economics is ultimately a drive towards contemplative leisure as opposed to Keynes' drive towards full employment. Every little insight is a glimpse of destiny, an edging towards Aristotle's "finest way" (*Nicomachean Ethics*, X, 7, 1177b 26 - 1178a 2).

²⁶ For instance, squaring a quantity like $(b - c)$ can be a difficulty at one level; at another, the identity of b here and b there (See Lonergan, *Phenomenology and Logic*, 62, note 40).

²⁷ **Fantasy** as central to the forward specialties is quite unfamiliar to present academic orientations. It will gradually be thematized and slowly shift the focus of human inquiry to a profound pragmatic balance. See also note 65 below.

²⁸ Arnold Toynbee, *Mankind and Mother Earth. A Narrative History of the World*, Oxford University Press, 1976, 32.

²⁹ *Euclid. The Thirteen Books of the Elements*, translated and edited with an Introduction by Sir Thomas Heath, New York, 1956, vol.1, 355. For Pythagoras' theorem in the Indian tradition see 360-64.

³⁰ A.K. Ramanujan, "Entries for a Catalogue of Fear," quoted in *The Poetry of Encounter, Three Indo-Anglian Poets (Dom Moraes, A.K. Ramanujan and Nissim Ezekiel)*, Emmanuel Naranda Lall, Sterling Publishers, New Delhi, 1983, 62.

³¹ This issue is the topic of P. McShane, "Systematics, Communications, Actual Contexts," *Lonergan Workshop (7)* Scholars Press, 1987, edited by F. Lawrence, 143-174.

³² I think here of the Dialogue of Krishna and Arjuna and the manner in which one can turn such questions as "Krishna, what defines a man?" (*The Bhagavad-gita*, translated by Barbara Stoler Millar, Bantam Books, 1986, II, 54). The answer to the question is, Yes: what defines a human, a pupil: when you are raising children you are raising questions. What is the topic?

Yes: What is the topic.

³³ *Introducing the Thought of Bernard Lonergan: Three Papers from Collection*, Darton, Longman and Todd, 1973, Introduction by P. McShane, 7.

³⁴ See note 17 above. What Lonergan calls “The Greek Discovery of Mind” (*Method in Theology*, 90-93) in fact culminated in the three evolutionary sports, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle. The Medieval sport Aquinas was condemned in 1277. Socrates raised the issue of the transition through the second to the third stage of meaning, the issue of the phyletic shift from the first to the second time of the human subject (Lonergan, *De Deo Trino II, Pars Systematica*, Gregorian Press, Rome, 1964, Quaestio XXI). Lonergan’s functional specialization is key to the efficient implementation of the shift.

³⁵ *Topics in Education* 232.

³⁶ But a philosophic culture must conceive of those levels in a seriously informed heuristic fashion. See above, note 9. So, there is the challenge of the field of neuro- and chemo-psychology represented by Candace Pert, *Molecules of Emotion*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1999.

³⁷ Ezra Pound, “Commission,” *Selected Poems*, Faber and Faber, London, 1959, 97. This apparently brief and casual reference recalls Pound’s stand and search, his unsuccessful effort to “Speak against unconscious oppression/ Speak against the tyranny of the unimaginative/ Speak against bonds” (*ibid.* 96). My *Cantower* effort seeks to sublimate his vorticist effort of 117 Cantos into a symbolization of the efficient cyclic global towering of a creative minority.

³⁸ Seamus Heaney, *The Redress of Poetry*, Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, New York, 1995.

³⁹ P. McShane, *The Redress of Poise*, 1989. The book is available free of charge on the Website, www.philipmcshane.ca.

⁴⁰ The drive of the series of 117 *Cantowers* (Website www.philipmcshane.ca) is towards a doctrinal specification of this new enlightenment, but a pivotal step in the reach for *Poise* is discussed in *Cantower IX*: “Position, Poosition, Protopossession” (December 2002).

⁴¹ What I mean here is a type of sublation of *haute vulgarization*. This is treated in *Lack in the Beingstalk: A Giants Causeway*, chapter three, “*Haute Vulgarization*.” One must look to the genesis of a culture that will give the new meaning to ‘explane’ which is caught in the neologist imaging of *ex-plane*: to express ‘down’ from a plain of theory to common sense so that it is recognized as such. Notice that this was part of primitive culture, of telling and listening to the tribal tale. It needs restoration, a component in the third stage of meaning. For Lonergan’s criticism of the normal

psychology of *haute vulgarization*, see his *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, 121, 155; Vol. 10, 145.

⁴² B. Lonergan, *Method in Theology* 299.

⁴³ *Ibid.* 350.

⁴⁴ *Insight* 186[210].

⁴⁵ *Method in Theology* 14.

⁴⁶ James Joyce, *Ulysses*, Penguin, 1986, 153.

⁴⁷ Identification is a topic in *Insight* 17.2.5. It is shifted into the context of identification of functional specialist endeavor in *Cantower III*, section 3.3 (www.philipmcshane.ca, June 2002).

⁴⁸ *Insight* 559[582]

⁴⁹ This is a large cultural and religious issue, an issue relating to the transition to a third-stage meaning of participation in providence or karma or whatever. A key text is *Insight* 7.8.1 which draws attention to “man the executor of the emergent probability of human affairs.” This pushes against both traditional Christian and non-Christian perspectives on destiny, captured in the Muslim poem, “‘tis all a checkered board of nights and days/ where destiny with men for pieces plays.” For me, there is my favorite New Testament parable, about the unjust steward, with the message “the children of this world and wiser than the children of light.” As I move through libraries on business and commerce I take note that far more energy goes into marketing soap than marketing salvation. The issue in the paper is the marketing of good education: it is not done by massive general texts and treatises remote from local structures. Perhaps a parallel from a field familiar to me will help. It regards economic texts. Recently I lectured in Texas – quite a big piece of real estate – on Lonergan’s economics. As I usually do, I perused the local textbooks. As I usually find, there was *nothing* in the textbooks about Texas. On my view of future economic texts, see chapter 6 of *PastKeynes Pastmodern Economics*. The localization problem is, of course, paralleled in education. See also note 62 below.

⁵⁰ *Insight* 588[611].

⁵¹ Herbert Butterfield, *The Origins of Modern Science (1300-1800)*, London, Bell and Sons, 1965, vii-viii.

⁵² See “Middle Kingdom: Middle Man (T’ien hsia: i jen)” in P. McShane (ed.), *Searching for Cultural Foundations*, University Press of America, 1984. There are complex issues here, however, of global religiosity and human destiny, that need refinement.

⁵³ The file containing Lonergan’s creative struggle of February 1965 has been made available in Darlene O’Leary, *Lonergan’s Practical View of History*, Axial Press, Halifax, 2002. Lonergan’s focus there was on

theology: he was not reaching for a general globally-significant thematic.

⁵⁴ One might pause here over my selectiveness, drawing attention to Lonergan's talk of "a complete retrieval system" associated with research (*Method in Theology* 127). I am being pragmatically realistic in my criterion of selection. If we miss out on some good described teachings, "the events" (*ibid.* 250) missed will be eventually thrown up in the dialectics of recycling. Further, you may note that my selectivity at this stage is not governed explicitly by some thematic perspective or philosophy of education, or by some strategy of student or peer evaluation. It is governed more by the admiring spontaneity associated with incarnate meaning. Of course, one can gradually include in the data accounts of what are contemporarily considered poor teaching and strange teaching. A later dialectic analysis could well reveal in such teaching "something better than was the reality" (*ibid.* 251).

⁵⁵ *Method in Theology* 161-162.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* 253.

⁵⁷ See notes 17, 18, and 34 above.

⁵⁸ This seems a very strong claim. First, consider my own work over forty years. It may well contain some decent interpretative efforts, but in general it is random dialectic work that perhaps should be classified as poor attempts at communicating the task within and outside theology. What of, for example, of F.E. Crowe's attempt at history in *Theology of the Christian Word: A Study in History* (Paulist Press, New York, 1978)? It moves randomly around the specialties and I offer it as a good exercise in discerning, sentence by sentence, what specialty he might be in. The same can be said for the work of other scholars, e.g. the mighty efforts of Robert Doran to interpret Lonergan on the nature of systematics in recent years of *Theological Studies* and *Method*. We are making a very poor beginning and Crowe makes my point nicely in concluding the work just mentioned. "When you have a mountain to move, and only a spade and wheelbarrow to work with, you can either sit on your hands, or you can put spade to earth and move the first sod" (*op. cit.* 149).

⁵⁹ The *Cantowers* appear on www.philipmcs Shane.ca on the first day of each month. *Cantower I* appeared on April 1 – Easter Monday – of 2002; the final *Cantower CXVII* is due December 1, 2011.

⁶⁰ Above, Part 2, paragraph 2.

^{0 61} Above, Part 2, paragraph 3.

⁶² B. Lonergan, *For A New Political Economy* 37. See above 49 above. This is not easy to fantasize forward to. But in the meantime one must advert to present centralist institutions that maim efforts to reform, especially in their promotion of alienating doctrines. You have, no doubt,

your own local illustrations. In Canada, no small spot on the Globe, there is a government Document, *Pan-Canadian Protocol for Collaboration on School Curriculum. Common Framework for Science Learning*, Council of Ministers of Education, 1997, not originating with teachers, not open to local tuning and “not well developed in terms of the suggestions provided to teachers for the learning and teaching of the curriculum” (Byron D. Butt, *An Examination of a Curriculum Development Model and the Role of the Teacher*, M.Ed. Thesis 2001, St. Francis Xavier University, Nova Scotia, 197-198). The Thesis is, in fact, an examination of a particular curriculum development in ocean-related studies for this sea-bound province. Butt’s study reveals the weakness of centralist and doctrinaire documentation. Most evidently, there is closure on other perspectives on education: so, the Nova Scotia Department of Education view was “We would be looking for someone who would be philosophically in line with the Department vision” (Butt, *op.cit.* 128). Fortunately, the government document at least advocates vaguely a vague constructivist perspective, but its language is in the mold criticized at the end of note 15 above. What was said above, note 49, of Texas and Economics, may well have an uncomfortable parallel in centralist and centralizing structures of education. Undoubtedly we need more enlightened NIMBY movements: Not In My Back Yard!

⁶³ “Metamusic and Self-Meaning” was the second of two Papers presented at the Florida Conference. The first paper dealt with metabotany: “Image and Emergence: Towards an Adequate *Weltanschauung*.” Curiously, these two papers coincide with my interest in the present paper: changes in the individual botanist (part 1), changes in the culture of any discipline (parts 2 and 3). The papers were published as chapters one and two of *The Shaping of the Foundations*, University Press of America, 1976; now available on www.philipmcshane.ca.

⁶⁴ On literary studies see chapter five of *Loneragan’s Challenge to the University and the Economy*, University Press of America, 1980. The copy on www.philipmcshane.ca has the advantage of being taken from Loneragan’s own copy, with his markings. On economics, there is chapter five of *Economics for Everyone. Das Jus Kapital*, Axial Press, Halifax, 1999. On linguistics, there is chapter 3 of *A Brief History of Tongue*. On Physics there is *Cantower X* (January 2003). Geometry was already mentioned in note 1. Bruce Anderson has dealt with functional specialization in law in *Discovery in Legal Decision-Making*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands, 1996, chapter 8.

⁶⁵ One major problem worth mentioning is the prevalent psychology of scholarship, which Loneragan himself shared: it is past-oriented. Forward-

oriented studies needs a disciplined heuristics of fantasy which will take decades to cultivate and identify. On Lonergan's psychology of scholarship and its effect on the writing of *Method in Theology*, see **Cantower I**, (April 2002) "Function and History," section 4, "Lonergan and Then-Enlightenment."

⁶⁶ Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, chapter 1.

⁶⁷ This may strike the reader as curious, since Lonergan is best known for his promotion of self-attention. But his discovery of Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas was a rediscovery of the Axial pointing of Socrates and his equivalents in other cultures described by Jaspers. Lonergan's economics, on the other hand, is not just a paradigm shift but an establishment of economics as a practical science, a paradigm at present quite unacceptable to the Establishment. See on this Bruce Anderson and Philip McShane, *Beyond Establishment Economics: No Thank You, Mankiw*, Axial Press, Halifax, 22001. (Mankiw got over \$1,000,000 up front to write his textbook: his name rhymes with thankyou!)

⁶⁸ A Context is *Lack in the Beingstalk: A Giants Causeway*, chapters 1 and 4.

⁶⁹ Confucius, *The Analects*, translated with an Introduction by D.C. Lau, Penguin, 1988, 137 (Book xv, 39, 40).

⁷⁰ *Insight* 15, 7.1-7.4.

⁷¹ See *Lack in the Beingstalk: A Giants Causeway*, chapter 1.

⁷² See B. Lonergan, *Collection*, University of Toronto Press, 1988, editorial note x, 263-4.

⁷³ **Cantower IV** meshes considerations of Robert Browning's "Childe Roland to the Dark Tower Came" with Elizabeth Browning's "Aurora Leigh." The theme comes from the beginning of Mad Edgar's song (Shakespeare, *King Lear*, III.iv.171). A childe is a young knight who has not yet proven himself.

⁷⁴ The topic of **Cantower V** (Website, July, 2002) is the genesis of the new metaphysics, but its challenge is woven round the lyrics to the familiar Scottish song "Will you go, Lassie, Go?" written by Francis McPeake which begins "I will build my love a bower."

